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Abstract 
This thesis analyses two Royal Commissions into the policing of SP bookmaking that the 
NSW government issued in 1936 and 1937.  These Commissions provide a window into the 
social history of betting and policing, as well as the relationship between two groups whose 
activities placed them so directly in each other’s paths. 
The Royal Commissions also reflect the politics of betting and policing contemporaneous to 
them.  The inquiries are symptomatic of deeper-rooted public concerns about off-course 
betting, and represent a poorly articulated, but publically supported disapproval of police 
tactics. 
I find that these Commissions are suggestive of lower-level police complicity in off-course 
betting and that senior police were at least tacitly complicit in their activities. Moreover, I 
explore why it was that in face of such overwhelming evidence the Inquiry’s Commissioner 
was reluctant to find conclusively that the evidence demonstrated police corruption. 
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Introduction 
On 22 February, 1930 a man named Henry George Farmer was arrested and charged with 
using his premises for betting.   Farmer was the owner of a hairdresser’s and tobacconist’s 
shop in inner-western Sydney, and had been for the previous thirty years.  In the Marrickville 
police court, where his case was tried, Sergeant Keeble, Constable Bradbury and a police 
agent named Mooney gave evidence against him.  According to their testimony Mooney had 
placed a bet with Farmer around 2:50pm, through a window overlooking a laneway beside 
his shop, and had watched several others do the same.  Soon after, Bradbury had approached 
the window and heard a man place a bet on a horse named “Eden Hall”, before he and 
Mooney returned to Sergeant Keeble at Marrickville police station.  The three men returned 
to Farmer’s shop, where Sergeant Keeble made a thorough but unsuccessful search for 
betting slips or other evidence that betting had taken place.  Following a suggestion by 
Bradbury however, Keeble found six slips of paper in a roll of linoleum at the top of the stairs 
behind a radio, which were tendered in evidence.  Four of the slips bore the names of horses, 
one of which was “Eden Hall”.  One of the officers also found a newspaper in which 
someone had highlighted the race-odds.
1
 
                                                          
1
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Farmer’s evidence told a different story.  He flatly denied taking bets on the day of his arrest, 
and had protested his innocence while his premises were searched.  During the search, which 
had lasted for over an hour, Bradbury had left the room for a period of five or six minutes, 
passing by the roll of linoleum at the top of the stairs on leaving and returning.  This was in 
spite of Farmer’s request that Bradbury not be allowed to leave the room.  It was not long 
after Bradbury returned that he suggested Keeble check behind the radio.  When the betting 
slips were turned up, Farmer had turned to Keeble and said ‘I told you, Sergeant, not to let 
that man go downstairs.’2  On this evidence, Farmer was convicted and fined £20. 
Six years later, Farmer’s case was re-heard before the New South Wales Royal Commission 
of Inquiry into Allegations against the police in connection with the Suppression of Illicit 
Betting.  After re-reading the police-court evidence, and examining Farmer, The 
Commissioner, Judge Markell, found that Farmer should not have been arrested.  The 
Commission also conducted a handwriting test, and demonstrated that Mooney had been the 
author of the betting slips found in the linoleum.
3
  Markell concluded that Constable 
Bradbury had “framed” Farmer and that he and Mooney had given false evidence against 
him.
4
  
The Royal Commission before which Farmer appeared was the result of growing political 
tensions surrounding the policing of betting offences.  Farmer’s case was one of 27 Markell 
heard before the Commission, which called on 83 police witnesses and covered incidents and 
arrests during a period from 1930 through to early 1936.
5
  As Farmer’s case demonstrates, the 
Royal Commission held police behaviour to a level of account for which the police were 
neither prepared nor habituated.  Significantly, not all the cases brought forward were 
                                                          
2
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3
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4
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5
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resolved as easily as Farmer’s.  There were limits in the extent to which the Commission was 
able to engage with the cases brought before it, and a number of allegations were left 
shrouded in doubt. 
The Royal Commission also highlighted one particular case.  Amongst the twenty-seven it 
heard, that of William George Mowlds distinguished itself, becoming the subject of a further 
Royal Commission which was issued early in 1937.  In 1933 three police officers had 
allegedly framed Mowlds and then given false evidence against him in court.  Although this 
type of police behaviour often went undetected, Constable Miller, a fourth officer involved in 
Mowlds’ arrest drew attention to what had happened.  In doing so, he set off a chain of events 
that put the police administration and its culture on stark display.
 6
 This thesis is about these 
two Royal Commissions of Inquiry; about the policing of betting and the politics of 
investigating it. 
By the early 1930s betting on horse racing in Australia was a sophisticated affair.  Informal 
forms of betting such as wagers or sweepstakes were popular, but most punters placed bets 
with a bookmaker or with the operator of a totalisator machine.
7
  A bookmaker took bets on 
calculated odds, and paid dividends in a pre-determined ratio to the principal bet once the 
results of a race were known.  Bookmaker’s odds were calculated to maximise the likelihood 
that a bookmaker would profit whatever the outcome. The totalisator machine by contrast, 
pooled bets and calculated odds in a pari-mutuel fashion.  Dividends on a win depended on 
the quantity of bets placed and the number of individuals who had placed bets on that 
                                                          
6
 Markell, Horace, the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Certain Matters Arising from the Report 
of the Royal Commission on Police and Illicit Betting1936, (Sydney: David Harold Paisley, 1937). 
7
 A sweepstakes or “sweeps” is a form of betting in which all horses are allocated to participants and the winner 
receives the entire pool of bets.  A wager by contrast, is a private bet between two or more individuals. 
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particular outcome.  After the race result was known, the invested money was then divided 
after a cut was taken for the machine’s operator.8 
In 1930s NSW, and in most other Australian states, there were laws regulating both types of 
betting.  Bookmakers were subject to the 1912 Gaming and Betting Act.
9
  This Act prohibited 
individuals from acting as bookmakers anywhere but on a licensed racecourse.  It imposed 
fines on anyone caught taking bets off-course and prohibited anyone younger than twenty-
one years of age from betting.  The Totalisator Act of 1916 placed the same restrictions on 
the operation of a totalisator machine.
10
  Although the Acts placed similar restrictions on 
betting the fines schedules were different.  While any conviction under the Betting and 
Gaming Act, which could include street betting, betting in an hotel or using premises for 
betting attracted a fine of £20, a conviction under the Totalisator Act gave the presiding judge 
the discretion to  impose a fine of between £5 and £20, and the lesser charge was often 
preferred.
11
 
Legislative deterrents notwithstanding, off-course betting was popular during the inter-war 
years in New South Wales.  Indeed, Farmer’s betting conviction was just one of 2878 
recorded in NSW that year.
12
  During the early 1930s, Starting-Price – “SP” bookmakers, 
“bookies,” or bettors – as they were often referred to, were a common fixture in most pubs 
and could often be found operating in tobacconists, barbershops or small businesses.  The 
odds they offered were usually based on those offered on-course, and were received either 
from a correspondent on the track, in the newspaper or on the radio. 
                                                          
8
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9
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Critically, the same laws which produced Starting-Price bookmaking also made it a policing 
issue.  As betting proliferated during the early 1930s the police were increasingly embroiled 
in its suppression.  Between 1910 and 1950 arrests for gambling offences increased 
markedly, growing steadily from less than one arrest per thousand people to just under 
three.
13
  In 1929 the police made 2069 arrests for illegal gaming, a figure which had increased 
to 3808 by 1931, making gaming offences to the largest single category of arrests for the first 
time in NSW history.
14
  It is important however, that such figures are read with caution, and 
not mistaken for an outright increase in crime.  Satyanshu Mukherjee, Michael Sturma and 
Judith Allen have noted that any crime statistics are the product of a range of factors outside 
the actual commission of crimes including crime reporting, the nature of legislation 
regulating a particular behaviour and the attitudes of police and justice practitioners.
15
   
In 1936 however, overwhelming public attention was given to the role of the police.  
Critically, as betting arrests increased, so did concerns about the manner in which the police 
were obtaining them.  By 1936, these concerns reached breaking point. Such was the disquiet, 
that the NSW parliament issued a Royal Commission of Inquiry. 
There have been few comprehensive studies of the 1936 Royal Commission and even fewer 
on its 1937 counterpart.  The most substantive is in Richard Evans’ 2004 PhD thesis on 
police power and more specifically, the personality of William MacKay who was the NSW 
police Commissioner between 1935 and 1946.
16
  Evans reading, which comprises two 
chapters, is thorough, well-researched and builds the two inquiries in a broader narrative 
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 Peter Grabosky, Sydney in Ferment: Crime, Dissent and Official Reaction 1788-1973, (Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 1977), p. 132. 
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 Alfred McCoy, ‘Sport as Modern Mythology,’ in McKernan et al. Sport, p. 40. 
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NSW, (Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1983), pp.  163-8; Judith Allen, Sex and Secrets: Crimes 
Involving Australian Women Since 1880, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 1-16. 
16Richard Evans, ‘William John Mackay and the NSW Police Force: A Study in Police Power.’ Monash 
University, Melbourne, 2005, [PhD Thesis]. 
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about William MacKay’s career.  In doing so however, he gets caught by questions of 
culpability, and overlooks the wider nuances of the Commission’s investigation. 
Kevin Seggie also examines the 1936 Royal Commission in his PhD thesis on the NSW 
police force and its relationship to Government in the period 1900-1939.
17
  Seggie’s 
treatment is more descriptive than analytical, and as such carries many of the assumptions of 
the Commission, rather than seeking to identify, unpack and interpret them.   Symptomatic of 
both Evans’ and Seggie’s analyses is a tendency to retrospectively blame the Commissions 
for not casting their net more widely, rather than questioning why the two Commissions 
reached the conclusions they did. 
More frequently, the 1936 and ‘37 Commissions appear as moments in histories dealing with 
gambling or policing.  Mark Finnane for example, mentions the Royal Commission in a 
history of the NSW police force, describing it as a moment when the police were ‘at the 
centre of attention relating to the policing of vice.’18  Martin Painter alludes to ‘inconsistent 
police action’ during the early 1930s,19 and Richard Waterhouse has referred to the 
Commission to demonstrate that betting was ‘rife’ in NSW during this period.20  Such 
histories are useful in contextualising the Royal Commissions, but often rob the police and 
SP operators of their agency.  More than this, they tend to pigeon-hole the Commissions in its 
relation to either policing or betting, when they are most constructively understood as being a 
part of both. 
                                                          
17
 Kevin Seggie, Aspects of the role of the police force in New South Wales and its relation to the government 
1900-1939, (Sydney: Macquarie University, 1989),[PhD Thesis]. 
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 Mark Finnane, ‘From Police Force to Police Service? Aspects of the Recent History of the NSW Police 
Force,’ in: David Dixon (Ed.), A Culture of Corruption: Changing an Australian Police Service, (Sydney: 
Hawkins Press, 1999), p. 8.  
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Papers on the Provision of Gambling, (Sydney, University Printing Service, 1996), p. 39. 
20
 Richard Waterhouse, Private Pleasures, Public Leisure: A History of Australian Popular Culture Since 1788, 
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This thesis also draws on sociological work relating to betting and policing.  Works such as 
Robert Reiner’s The Politics of the Police,21 Maurice Punch’s Conduct Unbecoming,22 or 
edited collections such as David Dixon’s A Culture of Corruption23 provide useful 
frameworks to interpret the allegations made against the police, and particular practices the 
Commission revealed.  Likewise, Alfred McCoy’s Drug Traffic,24 or Janet McMillen’s 
collection Gambling Cultures provide useful theories through which to interpret SP 
bookmaking and organised crime.
25
  Such work, however, needs to be treated with caution by 
the historian.  Not only do such analyses tend to interpret their subject in terms of social 
problems like “problem gambling”, or police corruption, these frameworks often interpret 
behaviour on terms and in a language not available to historical subjects. 
Finally this thesis engages with histories of policing and gambling.  Such work is often 
informed by and even contributes to sociological approaches, but is separated from this body 
of work by its intentions.  Mark Finnane has argued that in academic writing about policing a 
distinction exists between ‘those who see history as a question and those who see it as an 
answer.’  ‘It is largely the historians,’ he argues, ‘who question history.’26  Represented in 
Australia by writers such as Mark Finnane, Robert Haldane, Andrew Moore, Hilary Golder 
and Michael Sturma, this body of work is reasonably extensive, and has emerged as an 
identifiable strand since the 1980s, profiting from a broader growth of sociological work and 
social histories around this time. 
In 1930s NSW, SP bookmaking and the police force were both discrete and integrated 
entities. Although in the early 1930s, both represented distinct activities with their own rules 
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and values, they also existed in conversation with forces external to them.  Above all 
however, they existed in conversation with each other.  This thesis takes these two 
commissions as its subject and treats as problematic the politics shaping their investigations 
and findings.  In so doing it explores the agency of bettors and police in their broader social 
context and the relationship that had developed between them by 1936.  It argues that the 
Commission heard evidence which was incredibly suggestive of police complicity in SP 
betting businesses and that these behaviours were at least tacitly sanctioned by those 
supervising them.  It also explains how a combination of politics, investigative method and 
interpretive framework obscured these behaviours from the eyes of Judge Markell, the Royal 
Commissioner of both inquiries. 
The source material for this thesis is the evidence given before, and final reports of the two 
Royal Commissions.  These sources comprise eleven boxes of papers at the NSW State 
Records centre and four volumes held in the collection of the NSW state library.  
Newspapers, NSW parliamentary debates, joint volumes of parliamentary papers and 
legislation supplement this core material. 
This thesis has three chapters.  Chapter one situates the 1936 and 1937 Royal Commissions in 
histories of betting and policing.  It will examine the cultural, socio-political and 
technological contexts which shaped SP as a distinct and historically specific form of betting, 
and the process by which governments, policed communities and the police themselves 
developed a distinct organisational identity by the time of the 1936 Royal Inquiry.  Chapter 
two is a close reading of the evidence of the 1936 Commission.  It will analyse the 
Commission’s evidence as a means of investigating SP betting culture, policing practice and 
the relationship between them.  It will unpack the Commission’s findings to discuss why 
particular allegations were dealt with decisively while others remained elusive.  Chapter three 
follows the trajectory of the case of William George Mowlds.  Starting with Mowlds’ arrest 
13 
 
in November 1933, it explains how Constable Miller’s decision to report the actions of three 
fellow officers set this case on a trajectory that involved an internal police investigation, two 
Royal Commissions and enormous public and political scandal. 
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Chapter One 
The “Evil” of Off-Course Betting: From Betting Shops to Starting Price 
The cultural politics of the late nineteenth century is central to explaining the character of 
Starting-Price bookmaking in the 1930s.  The racing industry is at the core of these politics.  
By the late-nineteenth century, horse racing in the Australian colonies was enjoying 
considerable popularity.
27
  In 1880 the Melbourne cup attracted 100 000 spectators or about 
thirty-five percent of Melbourne’s population, and between 1880 and 1920 ordinary Saturday 
race meetings in Sydney regularly drew crowds of 30 - 40 000 people.
28
  The dominant body 
governing racing in the colony was the Australian Jockey Club (AJC), who controlled racing 
rules and standards.  Racing under AJC auspices valorised ‘good-sport’ for the improvement 
and training of thoroughbred horses.  As demand for racing grew however, the AJC’s 
authority came under challenge from proprietary race clubs.  These organisations offered 
events for horses excluded from AJC events and ran them over shorter, less challenging 
courses.  Profit and entertainment were the focus.  As Martin Painter and Richard Waterhouse 
have argued, ‘only in this way could the paying public be given a full day’s entertainment on 
a sufficient number of days of the year to make a business viable.’29  Just as significantly, 
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(Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992), p. 24. 
28
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proprietary racing provided a program sufficiently extensive for the profitable operation of 
professional bookmakers. 
Betting on the outcome of races had long been part of horse racing, but the growth and 
popularity of colonial racing fostered the development of a betting industry.  Painter and 
Waterhouse have noted that during the nineteenth century on NSW racecourses ‘private 
wagering at early race meetings quickly became overtaken by bookmaking.’30  These 
bookmakers however, were bound by laws preventing betting in ‘public places,’ and 
bookmakers were prohibited from erecting stands or even standing on soap-boxes to ply their 
trade.
31
  Rather, they were forced to shout their odds or don high-heeled shoes and ‘garish’ 
suits to distinguish themselves.
32
  Betting also spread into off-course betting shops, for which 
proprietary racing was ‘bread and butter.’33 Also illegal, betting shops were well-known and 
well-frequented.  Employing lookouts and ‘guarded by long corridors and banks of doors that 
could be chained and bolted against unwelcome visitors,’ they were also a source of 
frustration to police.
34
 
The spread of betting did not go unchecked.  Betting shops and the proliferation of betting 
more generally were amongst the targets of social reform movements in the decades 
surrounding the turn of the century.  These groups targeted a broad range of perceived social 
evils, seen to be symptomatic of a more pervasive social decay.  Centring on the temperance 
and other Protestant social purity movements, such groups sought to prohibit a range of so-
called vices and to have policies enacted to restrict the sale of alcohol, prostitution and 
gambling.   
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Finding an ally in the AJC, the anti-gambling lobby achieved some political successes during 
the final decades of the nineteenth century.   In NSW, the 1876 Gambling Houses 
Suppression Act was soon followed by the introduction of no less than 22 gambling bills – 
although very few were enacted – as well as three select committees of inquiry and one Royal 
Commission into gambling matters.
35
  Rather than effecting vast changes in the late-
nineteenth century however, the anti-gambling lobby was more successful in laying the 
foundations for future laws, and a broader politicisation of gambling.  The 1906 Gaming and 
Betting Act was the first manifestation of this trend which continued through the twentieth 
century.  This Act established a licensing system for racecourses, legalised betting at licensed 
racecourses, and limited the number of race days each year.
36
  The anti-gambling lobby is 
significant for its success in encoding particular values into legal and regulatory frameworks.  
More than this though, it provides an insight into the terms on which spaces for cultural 
expressions were shaped during this period. 
Religion was of central importance to this dynamic.  In the late nineteenth century, a divide 
existed in Australian society between those of Protestant and Catholic faith.  Chiefly a source 
of cultural difference, religious divide was also manifest in concerns about the provision of 
education and as such also had a political dimension.  The source of much cultural 
mythology, religious difference has often been mapped onto ethnic origins, and in turn onto 
attitudes towards vice participation.  Summing up this attitude in a semi-biographical piece 
on gambling attitudes in Australia, Ken Inglis talks of ‘the characteristic Anglo-Scottish 
                                                          
35
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36
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Protestant perception,’ which sees that ‘gambling is a way of losing.’ Equally, he states, ‘in 
Irish Catholic perception, it is a way of winning.’37 
Protestant churches did indeed sit at the nucleus of social reform movements, but their 
involvement is not well explained by such essentialism. For Michael Hogan, Middle-Class 
protestants, having resolved issues over education provision, ‘found their next political 
campaign’ in the growing working-class enclaves of the inner-cities.38  Targeting the “decay” 
they found there, such activists were derided by Irish Catholics, bohemian writers, Labour 
and Trade Union activists as well as those profiting from the vice trades, as wowsers.   Hogan 
has also emphasised that although there were Protestant and Catholic temperance movements 
from around the 1830s, they were fundamentally different in character: 
Protestant clerical influence stressed that drink was without any merit, and 
consequently there were calls upon the state to restrict its availability and 
ultimately to ban its use.  Catholic leaders, […] called for moderation in the 
community, and voluntary restraint or abstinence by individuals.
39
 
For J. D. Bollen however, the roots run deeper.  In his work on Protestant activism between 
1880 and 1910, Bollen has emphasised that social reform movements in the 1890s 
campaigned against a background of economic crisis.  He situates political activism within a 
broader Protestant response to these years of crisis.
40
  More recently, Judith Brett has argued 
that Protestant values, carrying with them a ‘baggage’ of anti-Catholicism were sufficiently 
pervasive to form the basis of Alfred Deakin’s Liberals, the party with which social reform 
movements found the easiest home in the post-federation political environment.  Religion 
                                                          
37
 Ken Inglis, ‘Gambling and Culture in Australia,’ in: Geoffrey Caldwell, (With: Bryan Haig, Mark Dickerson, 
Louise Sylvan) (Eds.), Gambling in Australia, (Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 12. 
38
 Michael Hogan, The Sectarian Strand, (Melbourne: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 146. 
39
 Ibid: p. 145. 
40
 J. D. Bollen, Protestantism and Social Reform in New South Wales, 1890 -1910, (Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press), pp. 1-12. 
18 
 
played a definitive role not only in shaping attitudes to vice participation, but also in defining 
it as political in the first place.
41
 
Although Protestant churches formed the nucleus of political activism, its successes relied on 
shifting patterns of alliances, interests and compromises.  Amongst these were the first-wave 
feminists or women’s movement activists.  Marilyn Lake, with the support of Judith Allen, 
has argued that social reform was part of a broader contest between masculinist and feminist 
visions for national culture.
42
  In her work, Lake demonstrates the existence of a masculinist 
vision of Australian culture in late nineteenth-century Australia, rendered invisible, she 
argues because men ‘appear in most historical accounts as neutered and neutral historical 
agents.’43  Epitomised by “the Lone Hand” figure, this culture idealised a bachelor model of 
masculinity, defined by his ‘rejection of the idealisation of the domestic man,’ who privileged 
intellectual freedom, heavy drinking, smoking, gambling and unfettered sexual access to 
women.
44
  Women’s support for temperance as well as prostitution and gambling regulation, 
and for a smaller group within this wider women’s movement, the campaign for women’s 
suffrage, reflected the negative impact a masculinist culture had on their own experiences.  
Lake’s argument has proven contentious, but demonstrates the complexity of forces at work 
in shaping Australian national culture at this moment in its history.  It is also significant in 
highlighting the importance of gender in defining patterns of cultural expression and 
participation.
45
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 Judith Brett, ‘Class, Religion and the Foundation of the Australian Party System: A Revisionist 
Interpretation,’ Australian Journal of Political Science 37, pp. 39-56. 
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 McConville, Chris, ‘Rough Women, Respectable Men and Social Reform: A Response to Lake’s 
“Masculinism”,’ Australian Historical Studies, (1987), pp. 432-440; Waterhouse, Private Pleasures, Popular 
Leisures, p. 187. 
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For some however, religious and gender conflict was a less useful means of comprehending 
the forces shaping late nineteenth-century society.  For many associated with the Labor 
movement, social reform movements represented an attack on working class leisure.  In 
debating the 1906 Gaming and Betting Act for example, the Labor member for Balmain 
argued that ‘the government profess to be anxious to put down gambling in all its forms, and 
yet they only aim at the man who runs the shilling sweep.’46  Indeed, the Act’s provisions 
which outlawed off-course betting, but sanctioned it at men’s and racing clubs frequented by 
the wealthy fuelled this critique.  In this vein Painter and Waterhouse have noted that 
amongst anti-gambling advocates, ‘attitudes towards gambling were very different with 
respect to the moneyed classes,’ contending that they were seen to be of a ‘different order 
from those that threatened the poor.’47   
 
Debates during this period about legalising the Totalisator machine mirrored these patterns.  
For the machine’s advocates, the totalisator promised the end of the bookmaker, and provided 
an opportunity for government revenue collection.  For Social reformers concerned about the 
impact of gambling on the poorer classes however, it was an unjustifiable recourse which 
would only worsen gambling problems.  In NSW the first totalisator legislation was not 
passed until 1916, when its use was legalised on licensed racecourses and a fines schedule 
was instituted to punish off-course use.  The Totalisator Act also represented one of the more 
successful attempts to raise taxation revenue from legal betting, which also included a the 
institution of a Racecourse Admission tax in 1920, a Winning Bets Tax in 1930 and a series 
of Bookmaker’s Taxation Acts from 1917.48  Significantly, the reluctance with which 
governments moved on the totalisator did not stop it becoming popular amongst off-course 
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bettors.  Illegal “tote” shops, such as John Wren’s infamous establishment in Collingwood 
proliferated prior to government action on the issue.
49
 
During the interwar years, the character of gambling politics changed.  Although gender, 
class and religion were still key determinants of individual gambling participation, public 
concerns focused increasingly on the politics of regulating a growing industry.  Moves to tax 
legal forms of betting have already been outlined, and Painter has placed the emergence of 
state-run totalisators across Australia in this period.  Racing also changed during these years, 
and the industry both modernised and consolidated during the 1920s, which stimulated 
betting enormously.  Brian Haig has shown that expenditure on legal betting increased 
markedly, and expenditure as a proportion of personal income increased in the same period 
on all forms of gambling, both with bookmakers and on totalisators. In 1920/1 this comprised 
ninety-percent of all legal betting.
50
 
Illegal betting also thrived during the inter-war period.  In these years off-course betting was 
changed significantly by an expansion of communications infrastructure.  Post-war, there was 
a marked growth in the numbers of telephones and radios installed around the state.
 51
  Race 
coverage and odds offered could be listened to in real time over the radio.  Betting 
information could be quickly and easily communicated from the racetrack to an off-course 
clientele, and bets could be made easily over the telephone.  Off-course bookmakers also had 
the means to confer with one another or organise funds at a moment’s notice.  A growing 
industry during the 1920s, Alfred McCoy has argued that the SP industry ‘boomed’ during 
the 1930s.  Critically, the demand for cheap, local betting which obviated the need for a tram 
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or race-track entry fee stimulated enormous demand during the years of serious economic 
depression.
52
 
Commentators have offered a number of interpretations for the rise of SP in the inter-war 
years.  For Waterhouse the phenomenon is embedded in an entrenched cultural attachment to 
British Sports despite a growing Americanisation of Australian culture in the years following 
the First World War.
53
  Others have emphasised the role of regulatory measures in changing 
the character of off-course betting.  In his comparative study of the phenomenon in Australia 
and Britain for example, David Dixon has argued that in Australia where there were both 
prohibitive laws and stringent law enforcement, organisation and syndication of off-course 
bookmaking resulted, while in the UK, off-course betting remained low-level for the greater 
part of the twentieth century. 
54
 Alfred McCoy on the other hand, has noted that Starting-
Price has been ‘the most consistent source of income for Australian organised crime,’ and 
examines SP within a broader process at work in the interwar years, whereby ‘petty 
criminality’ was transformed into ‘organised crime.’55 
The by-product of the rise in SP was greater police involvement in betting culture.  By the 
interwar years, clearer and prohibitive laws and the proliferation of SP betting brought the 
police into contact with betting culture in a way not possible previously.  Like betting 
however, by the early 1930s the police force also had a particular culture and organisation 
symptomatic of its history. 
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The NSW Police Force: From Consolidation to Corporate Agency 
The NSW police force was created by an Act of the colonial parliament in 1862.  
Consolidating several disparate colonial police forces, the NSW police force was charged 
with law enforcement and general government duties such as the oversight of elections, the 
collection of statistical data, and the management of court petty sessions.
56
  Some writers 
have pointed out that policing, both before and after consolidation had less-visible political 
functions, including the management of frontiers, the control of industrial disputes and the 
policing of sex crimes.
57
 
A uniformed and institutionalised police force is one particular manifestation of what police 
theorist Robert Reiner has described as the broader umbrella of social control.
58
  This, he 
argues, can arguably be seen to include institutions such as religious or leisure organisations, 
but is more productively considered as being ‘the organised ways society responds to 
behaviour and people it regards as deviant, problematic, worrying, threatening, troublesome 
or undesirable.’ Government-controlled policing institutions are only a recent addition to 
social organisation, and one which is generally associated with industrialisation and the 
growth of urban centres.  Clive Emsley has also demonstrated that the character of police 
forces reflects the values and style of their government creators.  In a comparative study of 
policing in England and France between 1750 and 1870, he compares the militaristic model 
developed by the French Absolute monarchy with early English models of part-time civilian 
watches in the English constitutional monarchy.  There, the French model was felt to be 
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antithetical to ‘English “Liberty”,’ and so civilian policing prevailed until Robert Peel 
established the Metropolitan police by an Act of Parliament in 1829.
59
  Widely held as the 
first modern police force, Monkonnen has argued that the key characteristic of Peel’s force 
was that it was neither civilian nor military and as such enjoyed greater legitimacy than 
anything before it.
60
 
The NSW police force too reflected the society responsible for its creation.  In the first place, 
imperial identity played an important role in shaping the NSW police force.  Mark Finnane 
has argued that at that ‘the establishment, consolidation and centralisation of colonial police 
forces was accompanied by the ready adoption of English policing regulations.’61  Notably, 
Charles Edwards argues that the Australian force differs from its progenitor in a key way.  
While British policing was developed on a model of local control, the 1862 Act placed the 
police force ultimately under control of the crown, and as such created a legacy of centralised 
control.
62
  For Hilary Golder and Russell Hogg by contrast, modern policing is linked 
inextricably with ‘the formation and transformation of urban class relations in the second half 
of the nineteenth century.’63 In a similar vein Michael Sturma has argued that the 1862 Act 
was precipitated as fears of civil unrest replaced a concern with managing convict discipline.  
He emphasises however, that there were tensions between these ideals and reality.  
Conditions for colonial police officers were often harsh and that recourse to alcohol and other 
pastimes such as gambling and prostitution was common.
64
   
The turmoil of the late-nineteenth century saw the integration of the police into the urban 
environment.  Against a background of industrial dispute, political agitation, urban growth 
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and economic depression, the police played an important functional role.  Finnane argues that 
the police had an ‘ambiguous’ position.  Acting as mediators in industrial disputes, they were 
often cast as ‘agents of government,’ although he suggests that they often played a more 
neutral role than popularly remembered.  On the other hand, police were also charged with 
more mundane tasks including the returning of lost children, the arresting of drunks and the 
breaking up of street fights.
65
  Hogg and Golder have suggested a broader significance for 
such work.  They argue that because of the ‘still primitive state of urban government,’ 
policing ‘played a crucial role in the struggle to secure a new urban discipline in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century.’  This contribution was facilitated by ‘the police’s uniquely 
localised organisation and presence in civil society.’66  This period was also marked by an 
expansion of police powers.  Finnane has emphasised that the political success of social 
reform movements was accompanied by a considerable ‘refining’ of police powers in relation 
to vice suppression.  Notably he has argued that moral and social reform ‘enhanced the 
potential of the police to control or oversee social behaviour,’ but put officers in closer 
contact with potential sources of corruption.
 67
 
In the early twentieth century, consolidation was accompanied by increased organisational 
autonomy and rapid modernisation.  Finnane has argued that early in the period expanded 
police powers were accompanied by the police force becoming ‘active advocate[s]’ for the 
first time.
68
  The increased corporate agency this implied became most visible following the 
First World War.  In 1920 an association for police was founded, and annual conferences 
between state police chiefs were instituted, although Seggie has argued that these failed to 
produce any ‘degree of uniformity’ between the various States’ forces, and most police also 
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became members of police unions, with the result that pay and conditions improved.
69
  
Policing practices were also updated.  Under the Commissionership of James Mitchell, police 
were equipped with radios and motorcars.
70
  In 1915, the first two female police officers were 
employed from over 400 applicants.  They were subordinate to their male counterparts, with 
lower pay and limited professional rights, and they were given, as Jeanna Sutton has argued, 
a ‘complementary’ or ‘specialist’ role, charged mainly with tasks involving women and 
children.
71
 
Particular urban policing issues faced the NSW police during the 1920s.  Alfred McCoy has 
argued that: 
In the years following World War One, the combination of narcotics, sly 
grog, SP bookmaking and prostitution created an enormously profitable 
illegal sector within the city’s economy and allowed the formation of a 
professional criminal class.
72
 
Most significantly, the popularly named “razor-wars”, between organised drug, prostitution 
and sly-grog traders and the violent gangs of razor-armed standover men employed to protect 
them, brought policing and crime into the public eye during the 1920s.   
As Sydney’s inner-east became a profitable and violent criminal milieu, it begun to receive 
sensational news coverage, in particular from the Sydney tabloid Truth.  Increased publicity 
turned underworld figures into celebrities.  Amongst them were Kate Leigh and Tilly Devine, 
who used actively engaged the press for public relations.
73
  At the same time, certain police 
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officers became well-known.  Amongst them was sly-grog and betting police Sergeant Cecil 
Joe Chuck who was known for his undercover tactics, disguises and astounding arrest 
figures.
74
  Evans has argued that the press was also used opportunistically by senior police, 
particularly William MacKay, to create a context of scandal as a means of encouraging 
governments to grant more extensive police powers.  Significantly, policewomen also 
became prominent in this milieu.  Charged with policing so-called “fallen” women, 
policewomen such as Lillian Armfield and those hired after her, were drawn into the fray.
75
 
With this in the background, the NSW police underwent important structural changes during 
the second half of the 1920s. These changes were characterised by both increased central 
control and greater specialisation.  The Central Investigative Bureau (CIB) was allocated a 
larger central office and its personnel were considerably expanded.  Targeted squads for areas 
including drugs, vice, betting and gaming, arson, sly-grog and traffic were established in 
these years, and the number of detectives was increased significantly, from fifty-two in 1925, 
to 330 ten years later.
76
  Reorganisation was also accompanied by several instances of police 
muscle-flexing in the public sphere.  In 1929 the recently formed two-man drug squad 
emerged victorious from a run-in with the Pharmacy board over the dissemination of the 
recently regulated cocaine through dentists and doctors, and police advocacy played a 
significant role in the addition of a consorting clause, which rendered liable to arrest anyone 
found consorting with an known criminal, to the vagrancy Act.
 77
   
The most substantive changes in police organisation and culture during this era stem from the 
influence of William MacKay.  A police officer from Glasgow, Scotland, MacKay was 
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named Commissioner in 1935, although influence apparent by 1929 when he served as 
officer in charge of the Criminal Investigation Branch.  Above all, MacKay sought to replace 
the “beat” system which he argued was obsolete as a consequence of population growth and 
suburban expansion.
78
  The beat system was that associated with Sir Robert Peel’s 
metropolitan police.  In explaining the logic of beat policing, Mike Enders has emphasised 
that it is a product of the increased anonymity that industrial cities brought with them.  The 
job of the police in the beat system was to bridge the gap between Commission of crimes and 
access to the broader justice system through knowledge of their particular community, 
otherwise known as their “beat”.79  The abandonment of beat policing was not unique to 
Australia.  Fogelson has shown that a similar transition was occurring in a number of 
American cities during this period,
80
 and Critchley has demonstrated a similar trend in 
interwar Britain.
81
  During his career MacKay made several tours of the United States, Britain 
and Mainland Europe, and the reforms he was the key figure in effecting reflect this broader 
international pattern. 
The broader significance of interwar police reform has been well debated.  Finnane has 
argued that these changes were part of a shifting conception of police role as the police 
‘force’ became the police ‘service.’ In the longer term moreover, he has noted that 
specialisation resulted in ‘the emergence by the 1960s of police leaders and managers who 
had detailed knowledge of only one area of police work.’82  In a different vein, Seggie has 
stated that the impact of MacKay’s reforms was to limit police presence on the street, which 
had an important effect on public perceptions of policing. He argues that ‘the police became, 
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for many, unseen wielders of powers not fully understood.’83  Indeed, police specialisation 
increases the opportunity for corrupt practice, but Mick Palmer has explained that it is only 
one amongst a range of possible influences on corrupt practices. These can include: 
unsupervised work amongst criminal entrepreneurs, extensive police discretionary powers, 
the use of informants, inadequate salaries, lack of accountability mechanisms and, specialised 
police work, many of which were present in the interwar period in ways not previously.
84
 
During the late 1920s and the early 1930s the police force was drawn to public attention for 
different reasons.  The police were the cause of considerable public concern following heavy-
handed tactics during an industrial strike at Rothbury coal mine in 1929, which left a man 
dead.
85
  Just a few years later, the police were embarrassed as the paramilitary organisation 
the New Guard made headlines by unofficially opening the Sydney Harbour Bridge under 
police watch.
86
   
The policing of vice also changed.  As economic depression and relaxed liquor laws shrank 
the vice market considerably, its shifted economics was shifted.  SP grew as other vice 
markets shrank, and as it continued to expand and take a profit, the police became enmeshed 
in its suppression.  Like drugs, traffic or arson, the policing of betting was a specialised area.  
Party to the broader pattern of police reform in the inter-war years, MacKay formed a squad 
to target sly-grog and betting in 1930.  As with other vice economies, the police were in a 
difficult position.   McCoy has emphasised that while some crimes, such as murder or theft 
create victims who seek retribution, illegal economies, are not only an ongoing criminal 
activity, but create customers who have few incentives to aid law enforcement efforts, and 
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every reason to defeat them.
87
  More than this however, the police were charged with 
suppressing a growing criminal activity in an environment characterised by growing concern 
that the police were deploying untoward tactics to obtain arrests.  As early as 1928 
complaints of unfair betting arrests were reported in the papers and in parliament.
88 
 
MacKay was sensitive to public concerns and the impact they could have on police 
reputation, and urged his officers to exercise caution in this area of their work.  In a set of 
addresses to betting police in 1932 and 1934, MacKay urged his officers to put their 
reputations first, and exercise restraint in this area of work: 
The first consideration is to see that you are right; do not risk your reputation on sly-
grog and betting shops.  If the whole city was nothing else but sly-grog shops and 
betting shops, never mind that so long as your reputation is clean.
89
 
 
MacKay’s speeches were rich in sentiment, but vague in message.  Above all MacKay 
implored his officers to adopt ‘clean’ tactics, almost to the point of a mantra.  ‘Whatever you 
do,’ he told his officers, ‘do it clean.’90  At the 1935 NSW police chief’s conference, MacKay 
made a call for uniform exercise of discretion, and the employment of experienced officers in 
betting work.  His comments suggest that the situation had not improved.
91
  Indeed, for all 
MacKay’s efforts to balance the effective exercise of police powers while minimising adverse 
public and political opinion, the storm he had tried to prevent arrived.  Complaints and 
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political concerns about police behaviour in relation to gambling mounted through the early 
1930s, resulting in a major crisis for police and their reputation in 1936. 
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Chapter 2 
Allegations against the Police and a Royal Commission of Inquiry 
On 3 March 1936, Labor member for the electorate of Marrickville, Carlo Lazzarini, placed a 
motion before the New South Wales parliament, calling for the appointment of a select 
parliamentary committee, of which he would be a member, ‘to inquire into and report upon 
the methods and procedures adopted by the police in apprehending and securing convictions 
against persons alleged to have been guilty of starting-price and street betting.’92 Lazzarini’s 
call received support from both sides of the floor.  Most notably, John Ness, United Australia 
Party member for the neighbouring electorate of Dulwich Hill expressed strong support of the 
motion.  Lazzarini’s concern was with what he saw as the overwhelming prioritisation of 
betting over the policing of ‘serious crime,’ and both he and Ness contended that police were 
framing hapless individuals simply for the sake of showing ‘their immediate superiors they 
[were] doing something.’93  Other members were concerned that the police were invading the 
privacy of people’s homes without search warrants or evidence, and that they were targeting 
agents of bettors, rather than the principals employing them.
 94
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Despite the support of Ness, Lazzarini’s motion was deflected by political partisanship.  In 
the absence of the Bertram Stevens Conservative government’s colonial secretary and 
responsible minister Captain Chaffey, parliament moved to adjourn, giving the government 
time to decide how to proceed.  Upon re-adjournment Chaffey announced that a Royal 
Commission would instead be appointed to investigate the matter.
95
  Rather than the 
internally appointed body Lazzarini had proposed, the investigation would be conducted by 
an external body appointed by the government.  For Lazzarini this was anathema.  He argued 
that a Royal Commission would amount to a ‘whitewashing,’ and be stacked with the 
government’s ‘friends’ from the police force.96  To Lazzarini’s contention however, came the 
government reply with equal rhetorical flair that a select committee ‘would not be 
competent,’ as ‘its members would be both the accusers and the judges.’97  A Commission 
was issued to Judge Horace Markell, a district court Judge from Sydney’s North Shore, with 
directions to commence that month. 
It is unclear why the government agreed to investigate the issue at all. It is unusual for any 
government to agree to an opposition motion, particularly when Stevens had so dutifully 
avoided Lazzarini’s past attempts to have the issue ‘ventilated.’98  In an essay on Royal 
Commissions as an investigative mechanism, Scott Prasser has argued that as well as 
producing empirical findings, Royal Commissions are a functioning part of the Australian 
political system, and have been for most of its existence.
99
  The shape, findings or even the 
existence of Royal Commissions he argues, cannot be separated from the broader political 
functionality they possess.  For those in power, Royal Commissions can serve a range of 
political ends beyond the need to obtain empirical information on a particular policy issue or 
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problem. They can be used to bide time, re-enforce policy positions, investigate corruption in 
particular sectors or government agencies, help frame policy issues or put them on the 
backburner.
100
  Whatever the combination of reasons, the Stevens government had little to 
gain in substantiating Lazzarini’s claims, or fuelling his critique of police practices and 
government inaction.  It is possible that the disquiet over the issue was becoming too great to 
ignore, or that they simply wanted to placate it.  Although agreeing to conduct an 
investigation, doing so through a Royal Commission was a clear statement that it would be on 
their terms, rather than those of Lazzarini. 
The Commission was detailed to examine the cases of individuals who brought allegations 
against the police in relation to the suppression of betting.  This method, although allowing a 
thorough investigation of individual cases, was slow and in the allocated time only twenty-
seven cases were examined, although many more were offered.
101
  It also constrained the 
Commission from investigating the wider context of the cases it heard. The Commission’s 
terms of reference contained eight clauses relating to allegations made by the members of 
parliament. These clauses included: the ‘framing’ of individuals for betting offences, the 
giving of false evidence to procure convictions, the levelling of street-betting charges instead 
of the lesser hotel betting, arresting innocents, entering private homes ‘without just cause,’ 
assaulting members of the public, wrongful inducement to plead guilty and the targeting of 
minor persons rather than principals in betting organisations.
102
  A ninth term added a month 
into investigations was to include the acceptance of bribes.
103
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The Commission also contained a peculiar provision.  Its terms of reference stipulated that 
cases could only be brought forward by three designated members of parliament.  These 
members were Messrs Ness and Lazzarini as well as Mr Sanders, the Member for 
Willoughby in Sydney’s North Shore.104  Lazzarini was empowered to bring cases forward 
then, but not to judge them. The by-product of this requirement was that of the 27 cases 
presented before the Commission, eight came from Lazzarini’s Marrickville electorate and 
six from the North shore.  There was a small selection of cases from outside these electorates.  
A further five came from Sydney city, an area represented by John Shannon who had vocally 
supported Lazzarini’s motion.  There were also four from the NSW north coast, which, 
although the Commission had the whole state within its scope, were the only cases from 
outside of Sydney. 
Commissioner Markell’s approach to the evidence presented to him matched these 
provisions. Above all, he was painstaking, methodical and set a high standard of proof.  In the 
Commission’s final report he described a two-fold approach to his task.  Markell limited 
judgements to the question of culpability in individual cases and maintained that guilt needed 
to be proven ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ before an adverse finding could be made.105  As 
Richard Evans has noted in his study of the Commission, Markell treated his task ‘as if a 
criminal trial.’  He talked in the final report of ‘charges’ against the officers, and in 
concluding them produced verdicts of ‘guilty’ or ‘unproven within the meaning of the 
Commission’s terms of reference.’106 
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Charges ‘Proved:’ Policing Rules and Practice in Betting Suppression 
In the Commission’s opening days senior police officers gave evidence about procedures, 
strategies and tactics adopted in the enforcement of betting laws.  William MacKay – by then 
NSW police Commissioner – and Sergeant First-Class William Keefe, who was in charge of 
betting suppression, described in detail the organisation of this work. 
Betting suppression was the responsibility of all police officers no matter where stationed, but 
was also subject to a system of centralised control.  For this purpose, Sydney’s twenty 
metropolitan policing divisions were grouped into four areas: A, B, C and D.  Each of these 
areas comprised four or five divisions and was under the charge of a Sergeant who monitored 
betting across their area and the performance of the officers under them.
107
  There was also 
the “special squad”. This squad was a small group of officers who operated out of police 
headquarters.  Not attached to any policing division, they were often referred to as the “flying 
squad” because of the speed afforded them by a motor car as they moved unannounced 
between divisions.
108
  This squad made betting raids across Sydney, often dealing with more 
difficult cases.  Similar squads were formed from time to time in regional centres.
109
  Men 
involved in this work were ‘specially picked,’ and if not in command, were rotated monthly 
so their faces remained unfamiliar.
110
  
Betting arrests were usually made during police raids.  An arrest required evidence of betting 
such as possession of betting slips, lead pencils and sporting cards or sizeable sums of 
money, often in small change.
111
  By MacKay’s rules moreover, an arrest required at least 
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two witnessing police officers to be present.  Betting raids were designed to catch bettors in 
action, and were generally conducted on race days in places where betting was suspected, 
observed or had been complained of by members of the community.  Working in plain 
clothes, raiding officers relied on fitting into their surrounds.  They would look, Keefe 
explained, ‘just like a man going in for a drink.’  Generally, junior officers carried out each 
raid, supervised from a distance by a senior officer who was usually more recognisable to 
bettors.
112
  Two or more officers were sent into an hotel or betting shop five or ten minutes 
before a race was scheduled to begin.
113
   Once inside, officers would attempt to procure 
evidence of betting, either by placing bets themselves, or observing multiple betting 
transactions.  While ideally a senior officer would be called in to corroborate, Keefe stated 
that ‘in the majority of cases […] it is the young Constables [who] do the arresting.’114  Police 
sometimes employed agents, otherwise known as police informants, “pimps” or 
“phizzgigs.”115   These were non-police individuals useful to the police for knowledge or 
access, usually in exchange for payment. This was a controversial policing tactic, MacKay 
himself testified that he ‘[did] not like them,’ and had sought actively to reduce their use in 
policing.
116
 
As the Commission heard individual cases however, it became apparent that the rules and 
procedures outlined by MacKay and Keefe were merely templates.  Indeed, Reiner has 
argued that one feature of police culture is that although there is only one rulebook there are 
three sets of rules.  In the first place there are “working rules”, those actually followed on a 
daily basis, then there are “inhibiting rules”, regulations that are followed because they 
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pertain to visible behaviour, and finally “presentation rules”, which are those stated 
publically.  Legal rules he argues ‘are neither irrelevant to nor completely determining of 
police practice.’117  Before the Royal Commission, MacKay and Keefe had described the 
latter, while the remainder of Commission’s evidence revealed the operation of the former 
two. 
In connection with the Commission’s investigation of twenty-seven individual cases, fifty-six 
police officers were called forward, forty-five of whom faced charges in one or more case.
118
  
Eight of those facing charges were police agents.  The most common charges were deliberate 
framing, the giving of false evidence, and the arrest of individuals known to be innocent.  
Frequently, these charges were levelled as a package.  Indeed in eighteen of the twenty-seven 
cases one or more officers were charged with all three. Thirty-one officers faced charges of 
this nature, against ten of whom one or more of these charges were proven.  In eleven of 
these cases it was found that the complainant had not been betting on the day of their arrest.   
Ernest William Howe for example, was arrested in October 1932 for street betting and 
resisting arrest, offences for which he was found guilty and fined respectively £20 and £1.  
He had been arrested by Sergeant Christensen and Constable Donnelly, aided by police agent 
Lynch.  The evidence against him was his possession of a betting book, and of a sum of £5 
15s 9.  At the police court, and again before the Commission, Sergeant Christensen, 
Constable Donnelly and Agent Lynch stated that they had been on the Pacific highway in 
North Sydney on Christensen’s instructions.  Hearing Howe take bets on horses named 
“Bondi Mary,” “Wolopin” and “Whisper,” they later heard him telling a man who had 
‘picked a winner’ that he would pay him inside.119  Approaching him at the bar, they stated, 
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Howe had made to remove something from his pocket, but was stopped by Donnelly.  Howe 
was arrested but struggled violently and had to be hand-cuffed, particularly as there was a 
hostile crowd of onlookers.  At the station a betting book was found in the pocket he had 
previously attempted to empty.
120
 
Howe denied that he had been betting on the day in question.  He said that the money 
possessed was for an insurance payment, and had been ‘punting,’ but not receiving bets on 
the day in question.
121
  He also denied resisting arrest.  Rather, he stated that outside the hotel 
Lynch had grabbed his arm, and when he had protested, his arm had been twisted up behind 
his back.  When the hotel crowd expressed disapproval of Lynch’s actions, Lynch had drawn 
his pistol, and after pointing it at the crowd, jabbed it into Howe’s side.  Howe further stated 
that during the course of his interview at the police station he had been slapped repeatedly 
and kicked across the room.  Howe told them that they had no evidence and Lynch had 
replied ‘oh, never mind, we have plenty of evidence to fix you this time; I have plenty of 
cloakroom tickets.’122  
At the commission, Howe produced a number of witnesses corroborating his version of 
events at the pub.  Further Mr Lilamond, a Starting-Price bettor claimed ownership of the 
betting book, and matched his handwriting to that inside it.  Unsurprisingly, the events at the 
police station were unable to be verified.  In the commission’s final report, Markell found 
that Howe should not have been arrested for betting on the day in question and that Constable 
Donnelly was guilty of wrongfully arresting Howe and of falsifying evidence to procure his 
conviction.  Lynch was also found guilty of the latter infringement.
123
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This pattern was revealed in a number of cases.  In Henry George Farmer’s case it was shown 
that Constable Bradbury and Police Agent Mooney had planted betting slips in Farmer’s 
house and then lied about it in court.
124
 In Thomas Dawson’s case, a large collection of 
witnesses established that Dawson had been playing dominoes, not betting on the day of his 
arrest.  It was also found that Constable Fletcher, the key officer affecting the arrest, had not 
only invented evidence about Dawson’s activities, but attempted to explain his procedure in a 
series of movements shown to be impossible in the time he alleged.
125
 
In one set of cases, these tactics were shown to have been repeated systematically by a group 
of officers.  Four of the complaints before the commission emerged as the result of a “flying-
squad” tour of the New South Wales north coast.  Owen Jurd presented corroborated 
testimony that Constable Ashton and Agent Webster, under the supervision of Sergeant 
Hungerford, had presented false evidence at the police court where Jurd was tried and found 
guilty of a betting offence resulting in a substantial fine.
126
  Likewise, it was shown that 
Vincent Curran, a mail contractor from Dungog, NSW, had been on his mail route at the time 
of a race yet was accused by police and convicted of having taken bets on it.  Constable 
Ashton’s actions were also called into question twice more in similar cases.  Although not 
charged under the commission’s terms, he was found to have mistakenly arrested Arthur 
Curtis of Port Macquarie in January 1934 and George Ridley in December 1935, both under 
circumstances where the individuals had been clearly innocent.
127
 
The commission’s investigations also revealed a small collection of other police 
infringements.  Amongst the cases tested, there were three officers charged with illegal entry, 
and seven with wrongfully inducing a defendant to plead guilty.  The investigation of Mrs 
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Sarah Fisher’s complaint against Sergeant Gallivan of the Petersham division for example, 
found that he had ‘entered and raided on the day concerned, the house of Mrs Fisher without 
just cause.’128  The officers involved had accused her husband, absent at the time, of being a 
bettor and rifled her household items leaving them in a messy state.  More alarmingly, they 
had been in plain clothes and failed to identify themselves as police upon arrival, nor had they 
produced a warrant on Fisher’s request.129  Similarly, it was found that Constable Kuschert 
had wrongfully urged John Ray Atkinson to plead guilty just before his hearing for a betting 
charge in early 1936.  Approaching him and his father-in-law in the court chamber, Kuschert 
told them he had seen the case’s evidence. Responding to their plans to ‘fight’ the charge, he 
convinced them that ‘you are not in the race.’130  Atkinson had trusted him and pleaded guilty, 
when on the available evidence Markell found it extremely unlikely that he would have been 
convicted.
131
 
For victims of police mistreatment there were several courses of action.  Three of the 
individuals before the commission had successfully appealed their convictions, and five had 
attempted but had their appeals dismissed.  Six others had had their fines reduced on 
application to the Minister for Justice and one man, Alexander Spiers, even had his fully 
refunded.  In one case, that of Vincent Curran the presiding Judges had made unfavourable 
comment against the police involved, and the charges against him had been dismissed.
132
  
Other instances brought up in parliament or the newspapers suggest that this did occasionally 
happen, but as a proportion of total betting arrests and amongst those presented before the 
commission this seems to have been the exception rather than the rule.    
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The obvious flip side to these practices was that the members of the justice system were 
accepting falsified or inadequate evidence.  While the commission made no findings on this 
aspect of the allegations, which was arguably outside its terms of reference, instances of 
attempts to influence court room proceedings abound in the commission’s evidence.  As was 
shown in Atkinson’s case, urging an individual to plead guilty was one such recourse.  More 
than this however, the commission’s cases suggested that judges often gave police evidence 
the benefit of the doubt.  In court and before the commission officers giving evidence were 
invariably clear and well-presented, with watertight stories.  Such clarity it seems was often 
rewarded.  Janet Chan has argued that police officers often enjoy ‘significant advantages’ in 
courtroom settings, because they are generally ‘competent in handling themselves during 
investigative interviews and courtroom examinations.’133  There was no doubt an element of 
this, but evidence emerging during the commission suggested that they were equally well-
schooled in manipulating legal proceedings. It was suggested during the commission that 
police were conferring on evidence.  In Dawson’s case it was shown that officers had aided a 
police agent in writing their statement before their appearance in court.
134
  On June 5 
moreover, a journalist from the Sydney Morning Herald reported that the previous morning 
Sergeant Sweeting and Constable Gregory, both appearing in relation to George Ridley’s 
case, had been found discussing evidence on a seat near St James station.
135
 
Indeed, police officers in all but one case demonstrated solidarity in the face of thorough 
cross-examination.  Both Reiner and Punch have contended that there is ‘a powerful code that 
enjoins officers to back each other up in the face of external investigation.’136  Evans has 
called this phenomenon the “code of silence” in language that likens it to the practice 
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commonly associated with organised criminals.
137
  In the collection of cases from the NSW 
North Coast for example, police infringements were proven by evidence other than police 
testimony, as the police officers involved all had consistent stories accounting for each 
other’s behaviour.  In fact, the police actions and behaviour in these cases were often 
indistinguishable from those who were found to have acted honestly; the difference was the 
existence of evidence proving the police accounts were flawed, and in some instances blatant 
fabrications. 
The procuring of search warrants was shown to be similarly problematic.  Warrants to 
authorise the entry and search of an individual’s private property required the authorising 
signature of a court magistrate or Justice of the Peace.  The processes surrounding warrants 
were also outside the commission’s terms of reference, but were highlighted during Anthony 
Oswald Kelly’s case.  Kelly had been arrested by the police on 27 January 1934 for using his 
hairdressing and tobacconist business for betting and fined £20 upon his conviction, and the 
police involved were being considered for wrongful arrest and falsifying evidence, although 
neither was proved.
138
  In his introduction to the case however, Mr Cassidy, who appeared on 
behalf of Messrs Lazzarini, Ness and Sanders stated: ‘I am going to suggest that they [the 
police] have a practice there, […] of getting their search warrants signed in blank.’139  The 
source of his accusation was a search warrant that Sergeant Gallivan had produced when he 
had entered Kelly’s residence for his arrest, and which was produced in the police court and 
before the commission.  The evidence on which Gallivan presented to justify Kelly’s arrest 
was obtained only a few hours prior to the police visit to his shop without a return visit to the 
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police station in the interim, indicating that he had signed forms ready for any search and 
needed only to fill in the requisite details.
140
 
The man who had signed the warrant was Mr Ernest Bowen, a Tailor and justice of the peace.  
Before the commission, it was established that Bowen had also signed warrants for a number 
of senior police officers including the then-retired Inspector Russell, Sergeants Keefe and 
Jennings.  He denied ever signing warrants in blank.  When asked to describe the procedure 
by which warrants were authorised he stated that the officers first ‘swear the contents, swear 
that they are true to the best of their belief by the bible, then I sign it and read the 
information.’141  When pressed however, he further stated that ‘on a Friday night they might 
come up when I am busy, and if there are two [warrants] together, there is usually the 
information on the top; I read that and I turn the bottom up […] If I am very busy I might not 
read the warrant.’  In response to Mr Cassidy’s request for clarification, Bowen stated that ‘I 
trust the officer who swears that it is true.’142 
 
Efforts to ‘Defeat the Police:’ Betting Culture and Police Surveillance 
Amidst the allegations, the Commission’s evidence also provided some context for police 
behaviour.  Keefe and MacKay emphasised that not only was SP betting a widespread and 
popular activity, bettors often posed obstacles to law enforcement.  As such, police often had 
‘information about them without being able to get the evidence’ necessary for a conviction.143  
SP bettors, the commission was told, had a range of strategies to ‘defeat the police.’144  Ever 
savvy to police tactics, bettors in hotels and small businesses set up elaborate systems of 
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security.  ‘Scouts’ or ‘cockatoos’ were employed as lookouts and bettors memorised bets or 
used ‘self-erasing pads’ to record them. 145  Betting slips could be hidden in ‘secret panels and 
drawers’ or yet more inventive hiding places.146  Betting businesses moreover, were 
organised and run with the police in mind.  Principals, ‘well known or suspected,’ Keefe told 
the commission, ‘[did] not take an active part in the operations at all,’ and agents or runners 
were instead employed, often on a commission basis.
147
 
For bettors caught in the act, strategies to prevent arrest came into play.  Disposal of evidence 
was one such tactic.  Along with the hiding of slips, the commission recorded instances of 
their being thrown into fires, flushed down toilets and thrown over fences into neighbour’s 
gardens where the police would need a warrant to search.  Police were often unsuccessful in 
pursuing charges when this had been the case.  The other option was to simply deny the 
charge.  As we have seen, in case after case it had been shown that police had arrested 
defendants by claiming to have evidence of betting which they didn’t have, perhaps hoping to 
elicit a confession and obtain leverage with the promise of a light fine.  The bluff however, 
was often called.  To allegations of betting made by the police, the claim that “I’ve never 
taken a bet in my life,” was repeated almost like a mantra. 
The testimony of those bringing cases forward could also provide detailed insight into the 
operations of betting businesses, often beyond what police could see.  SP businesses could be 
busy and profitable, and indeed often employed more than one agent or clerk, along with the 
“principal”.  Alfred James Ingram told the commission that he employed two or three clerks 
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in his betting business that he had run out of a room in the North Sydney Hotel.  These clerks 
would sit at a table and ‘work [the] sheets,’ posting prices and recording bets on sheets of 
foolscap paper.
148
  As well as obviating the need for him to risk conviction, these employees 
were necessary to cope with the volume of trade his business received.  Prior to races he 
reported that there could be up to 100 people in his room at a time: ‘you could not move, they 
were packed for a minute or two just prior to getting bets on.’149  A race, Ingram told the 
commission, could take between £10 and £60 pounds and on ‘decent’ days, total takings 
could be as high as £300 or £350.   Ingram also explained that he got his odds and prices 
information from a firm named “Telesports,” a company that supplied racing odds and prices 
to paying clientele over the telephone.  These odds were posted on a sheet of paper on the 
wall and known as “board prices”.  If a customer did not like those prices, they could place 
their bet and have it paid on the prices published the next day in the Herald.
150
 
Betting businesses were not always run so openly.  Benjamin Taylor conducted business over 
the telephone.  Operating out of rented premises, he had started his business by attracting 
customers from amongst ‘reliable’ friends and acquaintances by word of mouth.151  As his 
trade grew, he employed three agents who telephoned bets to him from amongst their own 
contacts.  He was shut down after ’12 or 18 months’ in 1934 however, and vowed to ‘give it 
up.’152  He told the commission that it was not uncommon for telephones to be installed under 
false names because they were disconnected immediately following betting convictions. 
For those acting as agents or clerks, their work depended on the location and organisation of 
the business, and the volume of trade it received.  Mr Lilamond, who appeared before the 
commission in relation to Howe’s case, had worked as a clerk for three different “principals”.  
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At the time of Howe’s arrest, he was working at the Union Hotel in North Sydney, for a 
principal he knew only by the name of “Nugget”.153   At this time, there were three 
bookmakers operating out of the hotel, and when asked about business, he explained that it 
‘would depend upon what share I got of the bets’ at the hotel that day.  In his estimation, of 
the betting carried out in that hotel, roughly three-quarters was ‘straight-out’ betting on 
published odds, while around one quarter ‘would be “tote” betting,’ which he felt was ‘the 
regular thing.’154  As a ‘precaution’ however, he would often write “tote-odds only” on top of 
his betting sheets.
155
  That way, if caught he would be charged with the lesser tote betting 
offence.  His principal would handle the payouts, and Lilamond was paid on commission.  
Fredrick Percival Pateman the other hand, who alleged that Sergeant Jennings had unlawfully 
entered his house, rang bets away for friends.  He operated out of his home, on a casual basis 
amongst a small clientele with whom he was well acquainted.
156
 
The commission’s evidence also revealed familiarity between bettors.  Amongst those 
appearing from North Sydney, Taylor reported that James Kerr was a regular customer at his 
shop and that he occasionally took bets from him.
157
  He also stated that he had known 
Ingram and Pateman for a number of years.
158
  Parker knew Ingram ‘by repute,’159 and had 
also advised Pateman, who it was alleged placed bets with Taylor, to come forward at the 
Royal Commission.
160
  If not personally acquainted with one another, these men all 
demonstrated an awareness and familiarity with the shape of the betting market, who were 
the major operators and where they set up shop.  More than this, their complaints all 
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implicated the same collection of police officers.  Sergeants Christensen and Jennings 
between them appeared in all these cases, and Constables Grant, Donnelly and Mooney all 
made multiple appearances in relation to them.   
Equally, those complaining of unfair arrest were often associated with a betting milieu.  
Seven of the individuals appearing before the commission had at least one prior betting 
charge, some of which dated back as far as 1927.
161
  The majority wrongfully charged with 
betting had been “punting” on the day in question, had done so in the past or admitted to 
doing so on a regular basis.  Many had betting slips on them or in their houses from that day 
or from previous transactions.  Farmer was known to post racing odds and results in the 
window of his shop, as did several other licensees appearing before the commission.
162
  
Those associating with bettors also left themselves vulnerable, particularly if they were 
known by the police.  George Algernon Parker, who told the commission he had paid 
Constable Mooney £5 to ‘keep his eyes shut,’163 was arrested for street betting after having 
taken money off an acquaintance to place a bet for him.
164
 
Collectively, the cases heard before the commission suggest that there was a large and 
thriving off-course betting industry.  That bettors were taking active precautions against 
arrest, to the point of structuring their operations around policing tactics, suggests equally 
that the police were engaged in stamping it out.  Markell’s findings had revealed however, 
that the police were employing nefarious tactics in doing so. 
In some of the cases brought before the Commission it possible to speculate about police 
motives.  Where the individual was a known bettor, it is reasonable to suppose that there 
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could be a sense of informal justice at work; an easy moral slippage between convictions 
obtained fairly on evidence and the false conviction of an individual known to be guilty.  
There was perhaps even a certain thrill in the chase, or a joy in catching anyone they could, 
especially those already under suspicion.  In any case, they were sufficiently unsupervised to 
make it unlikely they would be caught for overstepping the mark.  In his evidence, MacKay 
had been careful to emphasise that he placed no pressure on his officers to make large 
numbers of arrests.  In support of this claim he produced the speeches he had made to his 
staff during 1932 and 1934 expressing this very sentiment.  Keenly aware as he no doubt was 
of the political tensions surrounding this work, MacKay’s claims need not be treated as solely 
defensive.  The Commission’s findings made clear however, that this call had fallen on deaf 
ears. 
The Commission revealed however, that police tactics went beyond catching known bettors.  
Not only had some innocent people been wrongfully or mistakenly arrested, they had been 
framed, entrapped and even convicted on falsified evidence.  There can be few sanguine 
motivations for such behaviour.  Most likely, as Ness had alleged in parliament, officers were 
making arrests to ‘show their superiors they were doing something.’  Why they felt this to be 
necessary is less clear.  The search for professional advancement is one possibility, but it is 
also more than feasible that police were complicit in the betting industry, and needed to make 
arrests for the sake of keeping up appearances. 
In his work on Australia’s heroin traffic, Alfred McCoy has argued that ‘an element of police 
protection is a basic requisite for a heroin distribution network which hopes to operate for any 
significant period of time.’165  He explains that the nature of heroin addiction means that 
consumers require ‘almost daily association with a street-level pusher, who in turn has to 
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make regular contact with a wholesale distributor.’166  As such, patterns of contact become 
predictable, leaving it vulnerable to exposure, and ‘no heroin distribution network could 
survive for long if responsible local police or Federal narcotics agents were not at least 
partially neutralised.’167  Although betting businesses did not rely on chains of supply, except 
arguably for odds information, they did require regular and predictable contact with clients in 
specific locations.  While a small betting business operating amongst a local clientele could 
perceivably escape the gaze of the police, a larger, more profitable business running out of a 
hotel certainly could not.  That the SP industry was thriving seems unlikely to be solely the 
result of bettor’s tactics to ‘defeat the police.’ 
 
Charges ‘Not Proved:’ Ingram, Corruption and the Limits of the Commission 
Parker’s claims that he had paid Mooney to ‘keep his eyes shut’ were not the only allegations 
of police complicity in betting businesses.  Alfred Ingram alleged that over a period of twelve 
to eighteen months from 1934 he had paid Sergeant Jennings £20 a month for partial 
immunity to betting arrest.  A builder by trade, Ingram stated that he had started a betting 
business at the North Sydney Hotel around 1930.  By 1934, when Sergeant Jennings was 
assigned to betting work in the area, he had established himself as a principal, working with a 
clerk named Victor Hilton.  Within days of Jennings’ arrival in North Sydney, Hilton had 
been arrested and convicted on betting charges, costing Ingram £30 in fines.  As a result, 
Ingram had decided to explore the possibility of purchasing immunity from Jennings.  He 
said he had approached Jennings at the North Sydney post office and asked ‘could I interest 
you in the betting business?’ and that Jennings had proposed his home in Allawah, in the 
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South of Sydney, as a more suitable place to discuss terms.
168
  At this meeting it was 
allegedly agreed that in return for partial protection, whereby Ingram’s men would be only be 
arrested on a monthly basis, Ingram would pay Jennings £20 a month through Mr Cochrane, 
a hotel keeper in Surry Hills.  Jennings would also warn Ingram of impending raids through 
Cochrane.  It was alleged that this arrangement had endured until his partnership with Hilton 
broke down in 1935.  Ingram’s business had become unprofitable and he found that Jennings 
was no longer cooperative.
169
 
Jennings flatly denied the allegations. He told the Commission that upon his transfer to the 
North Sydney division he had quickly become aware of Ingram’s activities, but had found 
him difficult to shut down.  He said he had instructed his men to target him, but struggled to 
get evidence on Ingram himself and had as a result seen that the flying squad visited North 
Sydney on several occasions.
170
   
McCoy has further argued that ‘corruption in any enforcement agency is a function of needs, 
means and opportunity.’171  That Ingram had the need, or at least saw the advantage in having 
some level of police protection seems clear.  Betting fines, if incurred regularly, could be 
expensive, and regular interruption of trade by police raids was potentially ruinous.  Being 
able to manage these things through an arrangement with the police was undoubtedly a good 
business move, and his business was turning a sufficient profit to ensure that he had the 
means to attain one.  Likewise, Jennings certainly had the opportunity.  A senior police 
officer in the North Sydney division, he was able to plan to raid, or not raid, any premises he 
chose.  He would also have had considerable knowledge of the betting market; who the key 
operators were and where they were running their businesses.  Indeed, Jennings initial 
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targeting of Ingram’s men could even suggest that he knew Ingram was operating profitably 
and was encouraging him to offer some kind of arrangement. 
Ingram’s allegations are detailed and suggestive.  Indeed Evans has even gone so far as to 
assume they were true.
172
  Before the inquiry however, no matter how deeply the questioning 
probed, the burden of proof proved elusive.  Jennings, it was shown, had an impeccable 
record.  He had reported multiple cases of attempted bribery in the past, had no previous 
marks against his professional name, and was personally vouched for by both high-ranking 
and divisional police officers, including special squad head William Keefe, and the then-
retired Inspector Russell.  Jennings’ bank statements were produced, and his financial 
position thoroughly scrutinised, revealing no evidence of the chunky £20 instalments Ingram 
was alleged to have paid.  He was however, unable to account for the arrest patterns of 
Ingram’s men since his arrival in North Sydney, which police records showed to align with 
Ingram’s evidence.173 Ingram was acquainted with the décor of Jennings’ Allawah house 
although Markell, having visited the premises, felt that Ingram’s knowledge matched what 
could be seen through the window.  Ingram also produced witnesses, including Cochrane, to 
corroborate the various elements of his story. 
As the evidence unfolded Ingram’s story, at once plausible but partial, really became 
Jennings’ word against Ingram’s.  A bemused Markell, charged with forming a judgement 
and allocating culpability, declared:  
In these circumstances it must be apparent to anyone that Mr Ingram’s 
evidence must be scrutinised with the greatest care and that his bare word alone 
would certainly not be sufficient.  I can point to nothing which convinces me 
that he is not telling the truth.  It is a remarkable fact that in no respect has it 
                                                          
172
 Evans, MacKay, pp. 198-221. 
173
 Arrest Records in: SRNSW [9/2469] 
52 
 
been shown that anything which he said was demonstrably false.  What struck 
me from the beginning was that it was difficult to think that anybody could 
successfully invent a story so complicated as that put forward by Mr Ingram 
without it becoming apparent at some stage that he was telling an untruth.
174
 
On the other hand however, Markell felt that: 
The Sergeant’s career in the police force is unblemished, and there was 
abundant evidence to show that his reputation was of the highest.  These facts 
taken in conjunction with the matters to which I have already referred leaves 
only one finding possible, and that is that the charge has not been proved.
175
 
Ingram’s case demonstrated the limits of the Commission’s investigative ability.  As Evans 
has noted, Markell had been presented with evidence of ‘enormous value.’176  ‘It was,’ he 
argues, ‘a case study in the regulation of an illegal market by corrupt police, and the 
mechanics of the corrupt arrangements were laid out in painstaking detail.’177 
Notwithstanding, Markell’s findings were inconclusive.  Evans has argued that his ‘caution 
and narrow focus’ were to blame for leading him to ‘a soft and limited conclusion.’178  
Markell’s findings however, deserve greater contextualisation than this.  The key question 
regarding Ingram’s case is not whether corruption was evident, but why, in the face of such 
overwhelming evidence, Markell’s findings were so ‘soft’ and ‘limited.’ 
Above all, Markell was bound by the Commission’s terms of reference.  While the 
Commission’s ambit, calling for the investigation of ‘allegations against the police in 
connection with the suppression of illicit betting’ was very broad, its terms of reference were 
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not. Markell’s task, before he had even begun to examine the Commission’s evidence, was to 
an extent predetermined.  He was presented with a small selection of cases and charged with 
determining what had happened, and whether any police involved had behaved in particular 
ways.  Embodied in these terms then, was a particular notion of police malpractice which 
related it to individual actions; to a deviant officer who succumbs to temptation or 
opportunity.  More recently, this approach has been called the “rotten apple” theory of police 
corruption. 
Police corruption is a slippery concept.  Popularly associated with a police officer “on the 
take”, accepting a regular bribe or retainer to do or not do their duty, the question of 
pinpointing what this phenomenon is and how it works is more difficult.  Maurice Punch has 
argued that police corruption is simply one facet of the broader umbrella of ‘organisational 
deviance,’ and that the term is too often ‘pigeon-holed’ with the police.179  Mark Finnane has 
suggested that corruption has historically specific forms,
180
 and McCoy has argued that it can 
be stratified according to the degree of complicity officers have with the illicit economies or 
practices they are informally regulating, or in which they are participating.
181
 Police 
corruption and malpractice are not new; indeed Finnane has found instances of police officers 
accepting bribes in the colonial police forces.  Efforts to identify and target it, however, are 
only relatively recent, and have paralleled the development of a literature describing it in the 
second half of the twentieth-century.  While the findings of the 1936 Commission do 
undoubtedly reveal the existence of some form of corruption in the police force to modern 
eyes, they didn’t to those examining ‘allegations against the police’ in 1936.  Indeed, 
members of parliament and those making complaints knew that things were amiss in the 
police force, but corruption wasn’t the word they jumped for in describing it, nor was it what 
                                                          
179
 Punch, Conduct Unbecoming, pp. 1-21. 
180
 Mark Finnane, Police and Government, pp. 170-1.  
181
 McCoy, Drug Traffic, pp. 29-37. 
54 
 
they targeted when they decided to investigate it.  What the Commission lacked was a 
language of ‘corruption’ with which to frame the evidence before it. 
This is not to say that the Commission could not have been more probing than it was.  Police 
administration for example, was only minimally scrutinised. Only a small number of cases 
were presented, and several of the Commission’s terms of reference were left untouched when 
they could arguably have been pursued.
182
  Moreover, the role of the broader justice system in 
sanctioning police behaviour was almost entirely ignored.  In creating these bounds, politics 
too played its role.  The Stevens government were not in a position to receive adverse findings 
from a position of political strength, having refused Lazzarini’s requests for investigation 
twice in the past, and had every reason to frame the investigation on narrow terms. 
Markell’s position in his findings is best described as equivocal.  Any investigation creates an 
interpretive space, and in this instance it was one Markell left largely unfilled.  Indeed, the 
bulk of his report’s short conclusions section was filled with observations about the role of 
telephones and radios in illegal betting businesses, statements emphasising the importance of 
police rules and a recommendation that discrepancies in the fines schedule of the Totalisator 
and Gaming and Betting Acts be levelled.
183
  He did offer that the investigation had proven 
‘justified,’ saying that he felt that ‘this inquiry has revealed a state of things which is, in my 
opinion, exceedingly serious.’184  He was however, quick to qualify stating that ‘it must be 
kept in mind that the officers who have been found guilty represent a very small proportion of 
the total number of men engaged in this branch of police activity,’ even going so far as to 
suggest that the cases he had seen represented a ‘fair portion’ of those which might exist.185 
Markell was investigating a politically fraught subject, and his findings were revealing.  
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Drawing broader conclusions on cases that were unclear may have left him open to 
accusations of partisan posturing or a questioning of his personal integrity. It may even have 
risked miscarriages of justice for individuals appearing before the Commission.  It is likely 
that his remarks were designed to appear concerned, but above all to be inoffensive, and 
strictly legalistic. 
Despite this, the Commission offered a particular space for those appearing before it.  
Individuals bringing a case before the commission did so because they believed they had a 
claim to make against the police.  The forum provided by the Commission was, however, as 
significant in determining the outcome of those claims as was their contents.  For those who 
could provide evidence corroborating their allegations that proved they were the result of the 
actions of one or more individuals, the Commission provided a space to rectify any injustice 
endured.  The Commission struggled however, with claims that implicated both the police and 
the claimant.  As we have seen, the police proved more than willing to support each other, by 
hiding or denying each other’s indiscretions.  Likewise, those operating as SP bookmakers 
had everything to gain in discrediting the police if they had found them uncooperative, as 
Ingram had found Jennings.  As such, complaints like Ingram’s plagued the Commission, 
suggesting that there was something lurking underneath, things that were plausible but 
inaccessible, or in the language of the Commission, ‘not proved.’ 
Indeed this dynamic largely defined the Commission and its findings. There was one 
case however, which slipped through the net and simply could not be ignored.  This 
case came from Ness’ electorate of Dulwich Hill, that of William George Mowlds. 
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Chapter 3 
 
William George Mowlds was arrested and charged with street betting on 18 November 1933, 
at his smallgoods business at 509 Marrickville Road, Dulwich Hill.  Sergeant Gallivan, 
Constables Nelson, Perrett and Miller were involved in his arrest.  Except for Miller, all these 
officers gave evidence when Mowlds’ case was heard in the police court.  In their account, 
Gallivan had given Perrett, Miller and Nelson instructions at Petersham police station around 
11:15am, and the three men had proceeded to Marrickville road by tram.  From a vantage 
point near Mowlds’ shop, they had observed Mowlds take two bets on a horse named “Black 
Cat”, before proceeding back into his shop.  Nelson had followed Mowlds inside and, 
standing near the shop counter, he heard Mowlds ringing the bets away to a man named Ted 
on a telephone in the room behind the shop floor. Nelson left the shop and returned to 
Petersham police station.
186
 
At the station, Nelson told Gallivan what he had seen and the two men returned by car to 
Mowlds’ shop, where Constables Perrett and Miller were waiting.  Gallivan, Nelson and 
Miller entered the shop, and upon finding Mowlds, Nelson stated that this was the man he 
had seen betting, and Perrett affirmed Mowlds’ identity.  Mowlds responded that he had 
never taken a bet in his life. When searched, a number of betting slips were found in his 
pocket and Mowlds, it was alleged, went silent.  In cross-examination Gallivan agreed that 
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these slips related to another day’s racing, but that there were multiple slips for the same 
horse.  Mowlds was taken back to the Petersham police station and charged.  A sum of £3 4s 
10d. was found in his possession in small denominations.
187
   
In his defence, Mowlds stated that on the day in question he was preparing for a visit to 
Newcastle, and had ordered a taxi for 12:15.  A number of men were undertaking the journey, 
and one of them, Mr Thackeray, testified that this was the case.   That morning Mowlds said 
that he had been busy preparing for his trip. He had not been on the footpath since he had 
swept it at 8:00 am.  Mowlds insisted that he was not a bookmaker; ‘I still say I never took a 
bet in my life,’ clarifying that ‘I have made bets with a bookmaker, but I have never been the 
bookmaker.’188  He confirmed having betting slips from another day on his person, but said 
that they were from bets made, not taken.  He outlined recent bets, and explained that ‘I often 
back the same horse in the one race two or three times,’ although did not explain the logic 
behind this practice.
189
  Mowlds was convicted on 27 November 1933 and fined £20.   
In many ways, the facts of Mowlds case are unremarkable.  And this is how it would have 
remained, had it not been for the actions of Constable Miller.  Within a few days of Mowlds 
conviction, Miller had a conversation with a friend of Mowlds’ named Mr Williams.  In this 
conversation, Miller stated that he did not think Mowlds had been betting on the day of his 
arrest; that he had been framed.  From here, the case took on a life of its own, becoming the 
subject first of an internal police investigation, then appearing at the 1936 Royal Commission 
into the policing of illicit betting, and finally, as we shall see in this chapter, Mowlds’ case 
became the subject of a further Royal Commission.  This case provides a telling glimpse into 
the organisational culture of the NSW police in the 1930s. 
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Following his conversation with Constable Miller, Williams passed what he had been told 
onto Mowlds.  On 4 December, Mowlds contacted Inspector Russell, who was at that time 
supervising betting squads.  Mowlds asked the Inspector to speak with Constable Miller, 
which he did.
190
  Following an interview with Miller, Inspector Russell furnished a report on 
22 December.  Miller’s evidence was that none of the officers involved in Mowlds’ arrest had 
been at his shop until all four of them went there to arrest him.  Nelson and Perrett could not 
have observed Mowlds betting the morning they arrested him. ‘It was’ Miller had stated, ‘a 
put-up job.’191 
Interestingly, Miller’s statement found an unexpected corroborator in Inspector Russell who 
stated in the concluding paragraph of his report: 
I might state that on November 18
th
, a few minutes to 12 noon, I was seated 
in the rear of a tramcar – Balmain to Dulwich Hill – in New Canterbury 
Road, and just after the tram had passed Morton Park, which is midway 
between Toothill and Eltham Streets, I saw Sergeant Gallivan driving a motor 
car with three men passengers, one of whom, in the back seat, I recognised as 
Constable Miller.
192
 
Russell’s chance recollection conflicted with the account given by the three officers in the 
police court.  According to their evidence, at this point in the journey, the car should have 
contained only Sergeant Gallivan and Constable Nelson. 
On 9 December Russell personally visited Mowlds’ shop.  Here, Russell assured Mowlds that 
he had interviewed Constable Miller and that a departmental investigation would ensue. 
Mowlds was advised to attend Police Headquarters and make a formal statement, which he 
                                                          
190
 Ibid. 
191
 Ibid. 
192
 Ibid. 
59 
 
did on 14 December.  In this statement he put in writing his version of his arrest and his 
conversation with Mr Williams.  He also added that when Russell had visited his shop, he had 
drawn his attention ‘to the situation of my telephone in the shop.’193  This, he believed, was a 
key detail. Mowlds firmly asserted that it would be ‘a matter of impossibility’ for anyone to 
see or hear someone on the phone from the position that Constable Nelson said he had taken 
on the day of Mowlds’ arrest.194 
Mowlds written statement, taken without an interview, was the first in the Departmental 
Inquiry Inspector Russell had promised.  This inquiry was undertaken by Inspector Fergusson 
and involved the interrogation of the four police officers involved in Mowlds’ arrest.  On 22 
December, Constable Miller was shown what Mowlds had written, and was interviewed by 
Inspectors Russell and Fergusson.  Constables Nelson and Perrett were also interviewed 
having been given the opportunity of reading Mowlds’ and Miller’s statements.  Perrett was 
also given the police court depositions of Gallivan and Nelson to read before his interview.  
On 27 December, Sergeant Gallivan made a written statement having been presented with the 
entire evidence.
195
 
The evidence given by Gallivan, Nelson and Perrett in this investigation is significant.  
Critically, regarding the question of how the four officers came to arrive at Mowlds shop, 
their evidence had changed.  Gallivan told the inquiry that he and Nelson had picked up 
Perrett and Miller along New Canterbury Road, rather than meeting them at Mowlds’ shop 
and Perrett concurred.  As to the question of exactly where along New Canterbury Road, the 
men were vague.
196
  Nelson on the other hand, stated that after observing Mowlds’ betting 
transactions, he, Perrett and Miller all returned to the police station and the four of them left 
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the station together in the car.  The day following his interview however, he altered his 
statement to say that he and Gallivan had picked up Perrett and Miller on the way.
197
 
In his report on this investigation, Inspector Fergusson stated that he believed Sergeant 
Gallivan and Constables Nelson and Perrett were telling the truth.   
Fergusson was ‘of the opinion that Mowlds [was] undoubtedly an SP bettor,’ and believed he 
had sought an inquiry solely to ‘get even’ with the police.198  Fergusson said that he had been 
informed by: 
An independent and reliable man residing in the same locality that, since the 
day of the raid, Mowlds has boasted that the police failed to find the papers in 
his possession showing a record of his betting transactions on that day.
199
  
Miller received adverse comment.  Fergusson had been thoroughly unimpressed with him as 
witness, describing him as ‘untruthful’ and his actions as ‘incomprehensible.’200 He felt that 
Miller’s motivation could only have been ‘jealousy’ between himself, Perrett and Nelson.201  
More than this, he alleged cryptically that Miller had desired to help Mowlds due to their 
mutual membership of ‘a certain organisation.’202  He concluded that ‘the position concerning 
Constable Miller is most unsatisfactory,’203 and had ‘no hesitation in recommending that he 
be not employed in any secretive capacity whatever but directed to revert to ordinary uniform 
duty forthwith.’204  Fergusson had noted the discrepancies in the evidence regarding how the 
four men came to be at Mowlds’ shop, but believed that Sergeant Gallivan had adequately 
explained this aspect of the case.   
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Here the matter rested, until brought up before the Royal Commission. Here, Mowlds account 
of his arrest was the as in his statements and police court evidence, and Miller’s account was 
as per his statement at the departmental inquiry. In their evidence however, Gallivan, Perrett 
and Nelson presented yet another version of events.  On the way to Mowlds shop the 
Commission was told, Miller and Perrett had been picked up separately, Constable Perrett 
first, and Miller a few hundred yards further along New Canterbury Road.
205
 
Commenting on the apparent discrepancies, Markell concluded that: 
During the inquiry […], it became apparent that the fact that the Inspector 
had seen the four of them together in the car on their way to Mr Mowlds’ 
shop was entirely inconsistent with the evidence that they gave in the police 
court and I have no doubt that some attempt was made by these men to adjust 
their evidence to meet the altered conditions.
206
 
Markell found that Gallivan, Nelson and Perrett had ‘framed’ Mowlds and given false 
evidence to procure his conviction.
207
  In his report, Markell commented unfavourably on 
Fergusson’s findings, and Mr Windeyer KC who appeared to represent the Commission 
stated that he found them ‘inexplicable.’  ‘It follows from my finding,’ Markell stated, ‘that I 
disagree with that of Inspector [Fergusson].’208  He withheld however, from recommending 
against him, as Fergusson was out of the country and unable to give evidence or explain his 
finding.   
Markell also made a ‘special comment’ regarding Constable Miller, who had been taken off 
plain-clothes work following Fergusson’s recommendations.  ‘I can only say, that to my 
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mind,’ Markell wrote, ‘Constable Miller, in very trying circumstances, showed a standard of 
honourable conduct and regard for the truth which reflects great credit on him.’209 
In the months following the Royal Commission, Miller became an even more significant 
figure in the public debate around SP betting and its policing. 
 
The “Miller Case” and the 1937 Commission 
On November 30 1936, the report of the Royal Commission provided by Judge Markell was 
placed before the NSW State Parliament.  The following day the Premier, Bertram Stevens, 
announced that the Colonial Secretary had ‘direct[ed] the Acting-Commissioner of Police to 
suspend from duty immediately all members of the police force found guilty of charges 
referred to by judge Markell in his report, as well as all those members involved in the 
Judge’s adverse comments.’210  Markell’s findings implicated twenty-two police officers, 
including fifteen Constables and seven Sergeants, thirteen of whom were dismissed and the 
remainder suspended.
211
  Further action however, was postponed until the Crown solicitor 
had had the chance of ‘thorough perusal’ of Markell’s report.212 
For the leader of the opposition however, the report brought reflected a bigger issue.  
Referring to the Commission’s findings, Lang argued that: 
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The question agitating the public mind is at the moment is: what steps is the 
government taking to find out if the malpractices adopted by the starting-price 
squads have been followed in any other branch of the police force; and what 
steps have been taken to ensure that the conditions disclosed by the Royal 
Commissioner will not recur in any other branch of the force.
213
 
Claiming that the public had ‘no faith in the police force,’ Lang proposed an emergency 
motion to ‘introduce this session emergency legislation to place the police force again under 
the control of the government.’214  The source of his motion was the 1935 Police Regulation 
(Amendment) Act, which required the assent of both houses of parliament to dismiss the 
Commissioner, replacing a system where censure of the Commissioner was at the discretion 
of the responsible minister.  Lang had difficulty linking this particular concern with the 
findings of the Royal Commission, particularly as many of the cases predated the 
amendment.  Lang’s motion was not passed.  The sentiment which had provoked it however, 
found a more topical locus in what had become known by the end of December as ‘the Miller 
case.’215   
On 15 December, Mr Wilson asked the Premier if: 
In view of Judge Markell’s report on the honesty of Constable Miller, who was 
apparently disrated on false evidence, will the Premier take the necessary steps 
to reinstate Constable Miller to his former status?
216
 
Later that day, Ness voiced his concern that Inspector Fergusson, who was responsible for 
Miller’s being disrated, was being considered for a promotion to Superintendent.  He asked 
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whether that promotion would be held until the report of the Commission ‘had been finally 
dealt with.’217   
Miller’s most vocal advocate during these months was the newspapers.  Amongst the 
nationwide coverage the Royal Commission’s findings had received, however, the Sydney 
tabloid The Truth, led the charge.  On 3 January, the first edition for the 1937 calendar year, 
the paper ran the provocative front-page headline ‘is Constable Miller the victim of police 
terrorism?’218 and the following week: ‘Constable Miller Must be reinstated.’219  Their 
advocacy was party to a broader campaign against the police, which took issue with alleged 
brutality, a spate of unsolved murders and lax enforcement of liquor laws.
220
  In Covering 
Miller’s case, Truth alleged that a corruptive friendliness existed between MacKay and the 
premier, and treated as suspicious a silence about the Constable’s fate from both the police 
force and the premier himself.
  The source of the paper’s concern was not just the question of 
whether Miller was to be returned to plain-clothes work.  MacKay actively declined to 
comment on the findings of the 1936 inquiry, short of stating that Miller was being 
investigated for departmental charges, and that he would report only upon knowing their 
outcome.  Unsatisfied, the paper continued to push, contending that ‘there is too much 
shuffling and delay over the Miller case,’ and that ‘the authorities have clamped the lid of 
silence and secrecy on the case of Constable Mendelssohn Bartholdy Miller.’221 
In early 1937 senior members of the police force responded to the controversy surrounding 
Constable Miller.  Following a request by the Premier, Inspector Fergusson furnished a 
report, dated 4 January 1937.  In this report, Fergusson sought to justify his findings in his 
investigation of the Mowlds case and answer the Royal Commission’s adverse comments on 
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his report.  Fergusson’s new report contained lengthy description of his investigation’s 
procedure punctuated by extensive quotation of police rules.  He re-iterated his distrust of 
Mowlds as a witness, and explained that on his own thorough investigations of Mowlds shop, 
he had found that the major pillar of Mowlds’ argument – that an individual could not be seen 
on the telephone from the shop floor – was simply untrue.  He had also found Miller to be 
‘shifty and unconvincing,’ and argued that the Constable’s position was indefensible.222  
Miller had broken police rules specifying that misconduct need be reported, and had either 
lied to protect a bettor, or had failed to report perjuring police officers.  For Fergusson, either 
possibility warranted the recommendation he had made. 
Interestingly, Fergusson introduced his report with a description of what he described as ‘the 
manner in which the […] complaint by Mowlds was brought under departmental notice.’223  
In the paragraphs following, Fergusson stated that the ‘certain organisation’ referred to in his 
earlier report was the Freemasons.  The Mowlds case, he believed, had been brought to 
departmental attention under conditions unduly influenced by Masonic allegiances and 
practices.
224
  His allegations stemmed from the fact that Mowlds, Constable Miller, Williams 
and Inspector Russell were all Masons.  He stated that Miller would have been ‘made aware’ 
that Mowlds was a mason by the presence of ‘certain printed matter and ritual’ in Mowlds’ 
house, and reported that Miller’s allegations had been brought to him through the word of 
masonic individuals.
 225
  Russell, Fergusson said, had attempted to approach the issue strictly 
‘on the square’ – under conditions of masonic secrecy – something he had refused outright to 
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condone.
 226
  In Fergusson’s eyes, this procedure was ‘highly improper,’ and served to cast 
further doubt over Miller.
227
   
Finally, Fergusson responded to the comments made about him during the Royal 
Commission.  During the investigation of the Mowlds case, Mr Windeyer KC had stated that 
his prior report was ‘either blatant stupidity or it [was] lying [sic] special pleading.’228 
Fergusson had taken personal offence to this comment, and he concluded his report by 
stating:  
Mr Windeyer’s remarks regarding me are an open criticism and attack on the 
competence, honesty and integrity of a man who was absent and not 
represented at the Royal Commission and which by the great amount of 
publicity they received at the time has done me considerable harm.
229
 
He re-enforced that his conclusions were ‘strictly honest,’ and had he had the opportunity of 
appearing before the commission, he was sure that ‘such strong criticism would not have 
been made.’230   
Attached to Fergusson’s report was a cover letter authored by MacKay.  In this letter, 
Mackay expressed that he agreed with Inspector Fergusson’s findings, and that Markell had 
been mistaken regarding Constable Miller.  He suggested that a fresh commission be issued 
so that the Mowlds case could be re-heard and Inspector Fergusson could be afforded the 
opportunity of having his evidence heard.  It is unclear why MacKay took this step, indeed 
Evans has quipped that he must be the only police commissioner to ever actively seek one.
231
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Perhaps he had confidence in Fergusson’s evidence, or else in his ability to cast doubt on 
Markell’s previous finding. 
The proposed commission was issued in January 1937, and began hearings on 3 March.  It 
was to investigate ‘certain matters’ arising from the 1936 Commission’s report. The 
commission’s terms of reference were narrower than its predecessor and were condensed to 
just three clauses.  The government again appointed Markell as Commissioner, perhaps 
fearing that selecting someone else would open the government up to criticism that it was 
trying to whitewash previous finding.  If Fergusson and the police force were to be restored 
to public confidence, it was important that Markell be the one to so find. 
In the first place, the commission was to ‘hear and examine’ the evidence of Inspector 
Fergusson regarding his inquiry into the Mowlds case.
232
  In the second place, the 
commission was to hear new evidence from any person with respect to the case of William 
George Mowlds. Finally, the Commission was charged with investigating whether: 
In view of his conduct in relation to the said case of William George Mowlds 
and to any other matter whatsoever – Constable Miller […] has been dealt 
with unfairly or unjustly in his position as a member of the Police Force and 
what (if any) action should be taken with respect to him as regards his 
position as such a member.
233
 
As previously, Markell was painstaking, setting a high standard of evidence and refraining 
from drawing broader conclusions. 
Inspector Fergusson appeared before the commission on the third and fourth days of its 
hearings. Rather than being allowed to present himself on favourable terms, however, 
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Fergusson was thoroughly cross-examined by Messrs Shand and Windeyer, who appeared in 
aid respectively of Constable Miller and the Commission.  In their line of questioning, they 
challenged Fergusson to justify the importance he’d given to his concerns about ‘improper’ 
Masonic influence over the discrepancies in Gallivan, Perrett and Nelson’s evidence.  His 
contention that the police rules regarding internal investigations represented the ‘exact 
procedure’ he had adopted was contrasted with the access he had given the offending officers 
to their previous statements and the considerable time delays between interviews.
234
  
Fergusson was clearly uncomfortable with this unanticipated scrutiny.  He defended his 
findings, but was often unsure of himself, and answered questions indirectly, seeking to 
explain and qualify when pushed for “yes” or “no” answers. 
Over two days of intense examination Fergusson’s conviction was broken. On the morning of 
day five, Fergusson presented himself at the commission with a changed tune.  ‘At the 
conclusion of yesterday’s proceedings,’ he told the inquiry, and: 
Following an analysis of certain discrepancies of evidence, and also having 
regard to other matters put forward by counsel, I left the court in grave doubt 
as to the stableness of the opinion that I had firmly held up till then. I went to 
the chambers of my barrister, and told him that I had grave doubt upon the 
matter.  Last night and until the early hours of this morning, I gave very full 
and careful consideration to the whole of those matters.  […] After very 
lengthy and careful consideration I have formed the conclusion that I am 
wrong in my opinion in regard to these matters.
235
 
                                                          
234
 ‘Evidence of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (his Honour Judge Markell) into Certain Matters Arising 
from the Report of the Royal Commission on Police and Illicit Betting – 1936,’ (Sydney, David Harold Paisley: 
Government Printer, 1937), pp.43-90. 
235
 Ibid: p. 57. 
69 
 
Windeyer suggested that Fergusson was ‘laying special pleading.’ 236  Fergusson denied that 
this was the case and Markell accepted this.  He stated in his report that: 
I accept the Inspector’s explanation that he was mistaken with regard to his 
findings contained in his original report of the 12
th
 January, 1943.  There is 
nothing on which a charge of dishonesty could be sustained against him.
237
 
It seems unlikely that Fergusson had been genuinely dishonest in his report.  Pending 
promotion notwithstanding, it is hard to imagine anyone subjecting themselves to such 
scrutiny unless they believed they were right.  Maurice Punch has argued that internal police 
investigations often fail to reveal deviance or malpractice.  Amongst the reasons why this can 
be the case are solidarity between officers and the adoption of a ‘case-by-case, reactive’ style 
of investigation.
238
  During Fergusson’s investigation, Gallivan, Nelson and Perrett did 
undoubtedly display solidarity.  Certainly none of the three concerned officers confessed to 
having framed Mowlds and falsifying evidence against him.  Fergusson’s investigation had 
been reactive, comprised as it was solely of witness statements and the visit to Mowlds’ shop. 
Fergusson’s investigation however, was also shaped by deeper-rooted biases and frameworks 
than this.  As Fergusson himself noted his report was based on a number of assumptions, 
most notably, that Mowlds was guilty.  Around these two opinions he explained, he had 
organised the evidence and its discrepancies to form his interpretation.  His judgements 
however, suggest a further assumption that he had not acknowledged.  Fergusson had put 
himself at pains to demonstrate in his second report that he was well acquainted with the rules 
of departmental investigations, and had conducted many of them himself.  Yet his 
investigative method had privileged Gallivan, Nelson and Perrett in a way which gave the 
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officers the material to deflect the very allegations levelled against them.  In his investigative 
method Fergusson had given an advantage to Gallivan, Nelson and Perrett in a way which 
suggests he had presupposed their innocence. 
Fergusson’s implicit trust in his officers is not an isolated phenomenon.  Robert Reiner has 
argued that the police typically adopt an “us” and “them” outlook, which is coupled with 
heightened suspicion about members of the public.
239
  This generalised attitude perhaps 
accounts to some extent for Fergusson’s willingness to trust Gallivan, Nelson and Perrett.  
Mowlds possession of betting slips clearly linked him with betting in some way, and in 
denying his guilt upon arrest he had acted exactly how a bettor was expected to act.  Further 
than this, Reiner has argued that within the police force, there is often a ‘gulf’ between 
‘street-wise’ operational officers and ‘management’ level police, who are required to ‘project 
an acceptable, legalistic, rational face to the public.’240  This gulf, he argues, has a 
functionality regarding deviance because ‘it allows presentational strategies to be adopted by 
management levels in real ignorance of what these might cover up.’241  However real 
Fergusson’s ignorance was, he was certainly not disposed to entertain with any seriousness 
the possibility that Gallivan, Nelson and Perrett had indeed done what was alleged. 
This same logic was it seems, extended to Miller.  In his report, Fergusson had castigated him 
for not making his complaint through the official channels, mentioning that Miller had broken 
the rules in taking his complaint to Mr Williams.  During the internal inquiry, when asked 
why he hadn’t reported the officers, Miller had explained that ‘one does not like to have to do 
that, as you have to work with them.’242  It is unclear why Miller had chosen to act in this 
particular day.  The Royal Commission had found Sergeant Gallivan guilty of several 
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infractions, which suggests that Sergeant Gallivan regularly broke the rules.  In approaching 
Mr Williams, Miller may well have been motivated by their mutual membership of the 
masons.  It is more significant however, that having decided to act, Miller chose an informal 
avenue to do so, and sought the cover of secrecy.  Fergusson’s readiness to target Miller for a 
breach of process before considering the content of his claim suggests an ignorance of, and as 
such tacit complicity in a police culture which made complaining about fellow officers 
incredibly difficult. 
Critically, Shand and Windeyer had demonstrated that whether his actions were wilful or not, 
Fergusson’s trust in Gallivan, Nelson and Perrett had made him complicit in the type of 
malpractice the 1936 Royal Commission had revealed.  On the basis of his assumptions about 
Mowlds, Miller and the other three officers, Fergusson had not only failed to discipline 
deviant officers, he had actively endorsed their actions, all the while contributing to the 
vilification of a Constable who had done the right thing.  And he had supported the 
conviction of an innocent man.  What was perhaps most alarming however, was that 
Fergusson’s report had been so strongly endorsed not only by its author, but by the 
Commissioner himself. 
 
‘The Victim of a “Stunt”:’ The Hill Inquiry and Miller’s trip to Nyngan 
Fergusson’s commission appearance was decisive, but proved to be just the beginning. 
Although the commission found little new in its re-investigation of Mowlds’ case, when it 
turned to ‘the Miller case’ its findings suggested a deeper culture of police practices framing 
people for arrests they could not evidence.  Although the terms of reference had suggested 
that the Mowlds case would drive this line of inquiry, the commission revealed that there had 
been seven complaints forming the basis of Miller’s investigation between late December and 
72 
 
early February, all of which had surfaced during or after the 1936 Royal Commission.  In 
typical style, Markell’s focus was on individual complaints, and he set out that he viewed his 
‘function’ as being ‘to inquire whether he (Miller) has been unfairly or unjustly treated in the 
course of any of the investigations.’243 While in 1936 this approach had given Markell some 
purchase on the evidence, in investigating Miller’s case it proved totally inadequate.   
Six of the complaints against Miller came from a collection of aggrieved bettors and the 
seventh was an unsubstantiated allegation that Miller had sold a stolen car for a man named 
Mack.  In all but one of these cases, Markell found that the charges against Miller were 
‘baseless,’ but had been investigated fairly.244  What Markell’s analysis didn’t question, was 
the justification for these investigations.  Evans has objected to Markell’s findings in this 
respect, arguing that he seemed ‘oblivious to the possibility that a rapid series of official 
investigations, no matter how fair, can be a form of harassment.’245 More than this, in his 
capacity as Commissioner, it did not strike Markell as prudent to explore the possibility that 
the police department may have been seeking to discredit Miller.  Markell gave no 
consideration to the origins of the complaints, save for observing that three of them had been 
made by individuals known to Sergeant Gallivan, who had every reason to target Miller.  Nor 
did he speculate about any sinister motivations that the upper echelons of the police force 
may have had for investigating Miller, actively engaged as they had been during January in 
challenging Markell’s findings.   
The evidence collected regarding the investigation of one particular complaint however, 
suggested that all of these things were features of the departmental investigation.  In 
September 1936, Christopher Norman Hill contacted the police and stated that in 1933 he had 
paid Miller for Immunity from arrest, and Sergeant Lavelle was detailed to investigate.  
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During this investigation, Hill’s story was changed, and he stated instead that he had ‘“lent”’ 
£1 to Constable Miller in April 1933 following his conviction, but denied that it was to secure 
immunity from arrest.
246
 As a result of his investigations, Lavelle reported that as Hill’s 
evidence could not be corroborated, the matter could be taken no further.  On the morning of 
15 December however, Hill again contacted the police.  This time, he stated that Miller had 
visited him at his house the previous evening, and would be coming back that evening.  On 
the 16
th
, Hill again contacted the police station and stated that Miller had visited the night 
before, and had given him a £1 note.
247
 
Before the commission, Miller confirmed that he had visited Hill, and had done so following 
an anonymous phone call on December 12.  During this phone call, Miller said: 
They told me that the police department were investigating Logan’s case 
again, and they were endeavouring to put me down the “chute,” or some 
words to that effect, and if I came out, Jack Schaffer would be down Monday 
night, and I would be able to get a statement.
248
 
The case to which Miller referred in his statement was not described, but Thomas Logan was 
identified as an acquaintance of Hill’s who later corroborated Hill’s allegations in a 
suspicious manner.
249
  Miller was unable to identify the caller.  He stated that he had initially 
thought it was Hill, but before the commission was positive that it had not been.  He had gone 
to collect the statement nonetheless. 
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Miller’s evidence does not preclude the possibility that he was being set up.  It was revealed 
during this case that both Hill and Logan were acquainted with Gallivan, and Miller himself 
had suspected a set up.
250
  He told the commission that the morning after first visiting Hill on 
the night of 14 December, he had seen his name on a noticeboard at Newtown police station, 
instructing him to attend headquarters, and he became suspicious that a ‘trap’ was being 
set.
251
  Notwithstanding this, and against the advice of a Constable O’Dea, Miller made his 
second visit to Hill’s house that night. 
As a result of the Hill complaint, Miller was called before Inspector Walsh and Sergeant 
Sherringham at police headquarters on 17 December.  In this interview Miller gave evidence 
contrary to that he would later give before the commission.  He stated that he’d met Hill at 
Newtown Bridge between four and ten days prior to visiting his house and it was not until 
later in the interview that he referred to an anonymous phone call.  Miller stated that he had 
told another officer about the anonymous phone call.  Initially, when asked about his identity, 
Miller had been reluctant, saying that he did not want to bring him into it.  It was not until 
being interviewed again the following day that he reluctantly gave up O’Dea’s name, 
claiming that O’Dea had said to Miller ‘don’t drag me into this for god’s sake.’  When 
questioned further, Miller remained unwilling, stating ‘please don’t ask me, I have given my 
word of honour not to have him dragged into it, he is a very sick man,’ which suggests that 
Miller felt he was protecting him.  When Constable O’Dea was questioned, he denied that he 
had asked Constable Miller not to mention his name.  As a result of O’Dea’s evidence, 
Inspector Walsh recommended Miller for a departmental charge of making dishonest 
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statements.
252
  On evaluating this charge, Markell argued that it could not be ‘sustained,’ but 
that it was impossible to ascertain which version was ‘correct.’253 
Recent policing literature has dealt extensively with “whistleblowing”, where an individual 
reports corruption or misconduct from within an organisation.  It is an act which is often 
accompanied by organisational resistance towards the reporter.  Punch for example has 
argued that ‘when policemen set out to hunt other policemen this provokes tensions of a quite 
different order to, say, an external control agency’ taking up investigations, with ‘bitterness, 
banishment, hostility and hatred’ all possibly ensuing.254  Evans too argues that an ‘ethos of 
group loyalty at all costs,’ and the maintenance of a ‘code of silence’ surrounding discretions 
and malpractices, especially when they are widespread behaviours often re-enforces 
antagonism towards whistle blowers.
255
  Presuming Constable Miller’s statements are honest, 
O’Dea’s behaviour demonstrates this kind of antagonism in action.  Although O’Dea had 
offered his advice, given the role Miller had played in having three police officers sacked – 
all likely known to O’Dea, stationed as he was at a neighbouring division – it is more than 
likely that there was also some antagonism that he felt towards him, or at the very least a 
desire to distance himself.  When investigated formally however, O’Dea made an about turn. 
Unsurprisingly, his evidence was believed, saving his own credibility, reducing Miller’s in 
the process. 
Miller was instructed to appear again at headquarters on 21 December.  Constable Miller 
failed to do so, arriving instead at Newtown Police station after 1 pm.  He was directed to 
headquarters where he arrived at 2 pm. There he explained that his absence was due to a 
quarrel with his wife over an article she had interviewed for in Truth!  She had left him, he 
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stated, and he had been upset.  At 3pm Miller was asked to sign his statement on the Hill 
inquiry, and refused.  As a result, he was paraded before the MacKay, who, Markell reported, 
‘spoke to him as to his position, and pointed out that it was his duty to obey the 
regulations.’256  The Constable signed his statement and left around 5:45 that evening.257 
Although Walsh, Sherringham and their short hand writer present claimed the interview 
followed the ‘normal’ procedure, before the commission, Miller claimed otherwise.258  He 
reported that he had been accused of ‘“putting it over,”’ threatened with his job, and had the 
police rulebook slammed in front of him several times.
259
  He told the commission:  
When Inspector Walsh was questioning me, he would say to the shorthand-
writer, “Do not put this down,” and then the shorthand-writer would stop 
writing, and Inspector Walsh would question me to a considerable extent.  
After he obtained perhaps his view of the matter, he would say to the short 
hand writer: “put this down.”  Then perhaps when I refused to give a 
Constable’s name, but with no intent to disagree with instructions, he would 
pick up the Rules Book and slap it down several times.  I was threatened with 
dismissal, and that I would be taken before the Superintendent and the 
Commissioner and charged with neglect or with disobeying the reasonable 
demands of a commissioned officer.
260
 
Miller stated that he had been treated ‘like a gaol-bird,’ that ‘when I wanted to go to the 
lavatory or get a drink of water Sergeant Sherringham would escort me.’261  Miller said that 
he had been highly agitated, and at one stage had become ‘a little excited,’ to the point where 
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he had tried to escape the room.  Sergeant Sherringham had again accused him of “putting it 
over,” and Miller had ‘jumped up and went for Sergeant Sherringham.  Inspector Walsh tried 
to calm us down, and I made a bolt to get out through the door.’262  Sergeant Sherringham 
and Inspector Walsh reluctantly described Miller as ‘excited’, but denied the bulk of his 
allegations.
263
 
For Markell, Miller’s evidence was unable to be verified, and he was reluctant to push the 
issue further.  Miller however, had few motivations to invent such a story, and Sherringham 
and Walsh had every reason to cover it up.  The events which followed would however, tend 
to confirm Miller’s evidence.  Before departing headquarters that day, Miller was instructed 
to parade for duty on the morning of 23 December at Newtown police station, but did not 
appear as instructed.  Rather, at 5pm the Newtown police station received a phone call from 
the Nyngan police in Northern NSW.  Miller, they were told, had arrived earlier that 
afternoon and identified himself to them.  The commissioner of police was notified and in 
turn contacted Sergeant Sheridan of the Nyngan police.  MacKay instructed him to monitor 
Miller’s wellbeing closely, and accompany him back to Sydney on the following day’s 
train.
264
 
The two men arrived in Sydney on the morning of the 25 December.  Upon arrival, Miller 
was escorted to see the police surgeon, Dr Percy, and then to MacKay.  Following this, Miller 
was relieved of duty until 2 January, when he resumed light duties at the North Sydney Police 
Garage.
265
  MacKay did not explain why he had expressed concern at Miller’s state of being, 
or ordered a doctor to examine him upon his return to Sydney.  Having seen Miller just prior 
to his departure however, MacKay’s actions suggest that he had felt that there might be 
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reason for such a course.  Perhaps he felt that he Walsh and Sherringham had overstepped the 
mark during their departmental inquiries, or perhaps he saw in the incident an opportunity to 
discredit Miller further by casting him as mentally unstable. 
Statements collected on the incident were able to piece together much of Miller’s trip.  It was 
found that following his interview with MacKay on the 21
st
, Miller had cashed a cheque and 
bought a ticket to Dubbo, but had been found at 12:15pm the following day asleep at Nyngan, 
the end of the train line.  Miller was unaccounted for until about 7pm that evening when he 
was found by a Mr and Mrs Ward on their property “Green Camp,” located nine miles out of 
Nyngan.  The couple took Miller in for the night, giving him a meal and accommodation in 
the shearer’s huts on their property.  Ward recounted that when he arrived, Miller was ‘quite 
unable to recollect his identity and where he had come from.’266  After breakfast, Miller and 
Ward had a conversation during which Miller was able to recollect his name and that he was 
a police officer.  After lunch, Miller produced a piece of the Sydney Morning Herald.  The 
paper had an article relating to his participation in the 1936 Commission in which some 
sandwiches had been wrapped, and he explained to the Wards that his memory had been 
restored.  He voluntarily returned to the Nyngan police station and soon after to Sydney.
267
   
The reasons for Constable Miller’s unexpected visit to Nyngan were the source of 
considerable contention both for the police administration and before the commission.  Dr 
Percy examined the Constable several times during January and reported in February that:  
When I examined Constable Miller on the 25
th
 December, 1936, he was 
depressed and emotionally unstable, occasionally breaking down.  His 
speech was hesitant but his conversation rational and he had no confusion 
regarding his present position.  Apart from a lapse in memory from Monday 
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night until he found himself some miles out of Nyngan, his memory 
appeared to be normal.  His condition was such that I cannot exclude the 
possibility of his having had a lapse.
268
 
A series of departmental investigations conducted by Walsh and Sherringham, however, set 
out that Miller’s loss of memory was a “sham.”269 More than this, MacKay stated before the 
Commission that he thought that Truth had ‘concocted’ Miller’s absence in a ‘campaign to 
make newspaper profits.’270  He did not believe that Miller was himself responsible, but had 
been the ‘victim of a “stunt”.’271 
The episode did not end here.  Markell’s analysis of the police inquiry which had labelled 
Miller’s trip a “sham,” found that Walsh and Sherringham had conducted their investigations 
with demonstrable bias, and had wilfully misrepresented evidence, to depict Miller as 
‘boastful,’ and a ‘liar.’272  Even MacKay begun to show strain as this evidence was being 
given, and was reduced to angry outbursts during the hearings.  Evans has discovered an 
exchange between MacKay and Shand that was omitted from the official transcript.
273
  Shand 
had ‘rebuked Walsh for looking at Mr MacKay instead of at him when he was asking 
questions’ and had provocatively asked Walsh whether Sherringham was ‘the prime bully of 
the force.’  MacKay, who was present at the hearing, had interjected. ‘I resent that very 
much,’ he complained, ‘why don’t you do that somewhere else?’  Shand replied that MacKay 
had been selective in his production of documents for the commission, and MacKay said that 
he was not going to allow ‘such vicious attacks to be made on him.’  In spite of this evidence 
and MacKay’s behaviour however, Markell was not prepared to find that the officers had 
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been ‘consciously unfair to Constable Miller.’274  Rather, he stated that the two men should 
perhaps not have been detailed with this investigation given their involvement in the Hill 
case, and that he regretted Dr Percy had not reported on Miller’s mental state earlier.275 
While this was happening, an interesting item was tendered in evidence by Miller’s counsel, 
Mr Shand.  The item was a list entitled “Charges against the Commissioner of the Police,” 
and enumerated ten ways that it claimed MacKay had personally mistreated Miller.
276
  The 
list included the attempt to ‘discredit’ Miller in order to protect Fergusson, that he had 
‘improperly prejudiced the case of Constable Miller’s absence,’ that he had deliberately 
construed Miller’s illness as a “stunt,” and that the departmental inquiry of December-
January had been conducted with the deliberate intent of re-opening ‘baseless’  charges so as 
to discredit Miller.
277
  Markell examined the charges in his typical style, and ambiguously 
worded as they were, they remained unproven.  The list’s author remained anonymous.  
Questioned in the commission, MacKay stated that he did not believe that Miller ‘had 
anything to do with the drawing-up of the ten charges against me.’278  Evans has speculated 
that the charges’ author was in fact Ezra Norton, the owner of the Truth! newspaper.279 
Truth had been active during the Royal Commission, and had even gone so far as to pay for 
Miller’s engagement of Shand as his counsel.280  Perhaps more importantly, within their 
editorial space, Truth took on an important role during the proceedings.  While Markell’s 
limited terms of reference, the burden of proof and the political pressures surrounding the 
case often left his hands tied, Truth faced none of the same problems.  Their duty was to their 
readership and their profit-margin, and as such they were free to suggest their own 
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interpretations of what was going on, indeed in this case they stood to benefit by doing so.  In 
this way, Truth and the newspaper press generally was uniquely placed to break in an 
informal way the barrier between what was suspected and what could be evidenced or 
proven, and it was a role they filled with enthusiasm. 
In his final report, Markell made minor findings.  He stated that in general Miller had not 
been treated ‘unfairly,’ but with a ‘desire, if possible, to prove that he was untruthful and 
unreliable.’281  For Markell, Miller was an ambiguous figure.  He took seriously the 
allegation that Miller had been mistreated.  Yet without situating it in the broader context of 
the police administration and hence considering the possibility of a police campaign to 
discredit Miller, Markell was not only unable to explore police culpability he was unable to 
comprehend why Miller had acted the way he did.  Although praising of Miller’s altruism, he 
was also concerned that Miller had been overly equivocal, and at times contradictory.
 282
  
Markell struggled to explain why Miller had visited Hill at all, why he had presented two sets 
of evidence about how Hill had contacted him, and his reluctance to identify Constable 
O’Dea.  While during the 1936 Commission, Markell’s approach had given him some 
purchase on the allegations before him, in 1937 his inability and unwillingness to link the 
specific to the general left him blind to and in effect complicit in the police culture he was 
investigating. 
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Conclusion 
 
Following the Royal Commissions, the Stevens government launched a campaign against SP 
betting.
283
  The police embraced the new mood with fervour.  On 13 May 1938, Judge 
Markell presented Keefe, then head of the Metropolitan Anti-Vice squad with court orders 
declaring three city hotels ‘common gaming houses.’284  Under the Gaming and Betting Act 
(1912), on the affidavit of a police Superintendent, Inspector or sub-Inspector any premises 
could be declared a ‘common gaming house.’285  If a magistrate made this declaration, the 
police were authorised to enter that premises without a warrant, ‘break open any doors, 
windows and partitions,’ and once inside ‘seize any instruments of gaming and any 
instruments of betting and documents relating to betting, and any money and securities for 
money’ they found there.286  Such a declaration also placed the onus of proof on any person 
found on the premises to prove they were there for legal purposes.  In its reporting of these 
declarations, the Sydney Morning Herald pointed out that although this provision had been 
within police powers since 1906, it had never before been exercised.
287
  Nor did it seem like 
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it would be a once-only event.  Indeed, the three declarations of 13 May were accompanied 
by a public warning from Keefe: ‘There will be others,’ the Herald quoted him saying.288  
Shortly after, the Stevens government amended the Gaming and Betting Act.  In October 
1938, the broadcast or publishing of any race results and the telephoning of odds information 
from racecourses was banned.
289
   
The bettors, for their part, simply adapted.  McCoy has written that ‘the day after the law 
went into effect in October, “tic-tac” signallers appeared at Randwick communicating on-
course bookmakers’ odds to a telescope observer outside the course.’290  No longer welcome 
in hotels, bettors simply started plying their trade over the telephone.
291
 
Constable Miller served out his career in the NSW police force, although Evans has noted 
that it ‘was less than meteoric.’292   Promoted to Constable first-class in 1940 and Senior 
Constable in 1947 Miller remained at this rank until he retired in 1963.  Evans has also noted 
that on discharge his endorsement was “very good,” which he states ‘is only lukewarm in the 
lexicon of police service cards.’293 
The inquiry had revealed that SP was rife and that suppression efforts weren’t getting rid of 
it, yet tougher laws had been the response.  The inquiries had also revealed police malpractice 
and abuse of powers in betting suppression, but were nonetheless used as a means of 
justifying increased police involvement in SP bookmaking, as the police were given a 
mandate to crack down on it.  Finally, the inquiry had demonstrated that the police were 
antithetical to those seeking to keep them accountable, yet were left to oversee Miller’s future 
career.   
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There is a certain irony in this course of action, bound up in the way the allegations had been 
interpreted.  Lacking a vocabulary of ‘corruption,’ the result of the commissions had been to 
blame the individuals responsible for misdemeanours it revealed.  Once these aberrant 
officers had been dismissed, the government’s reforms implied, the police could proceed 
unhindered and empowered with the task of policing the bettors.  Without the vocabulary of 
corruption that is to say, they failed to see how badly they had misdiagnosed the problem. 
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